Tam Marti, Quam Mercurio.

*The true and lively Portraiture of the Ho.^ble and learned Knight S.^r Walter Ralegh.*

R. Vaughan sculp:

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# *WR The Cabinet-Council:*

Containing the Cheif ARTS
OF
# EMPIRE,
And MYSTERIES of
# STATE;
DISCABINETED
In *Political* and *Polemical Aphorisms* grounded on *Authority*, and *Experience*;
And illustrated with the choicest Examples and Historical Observations.

By the Ever-renowned Knight,
Sir WALTER RALEIGH,
Published
By JOHN MILTON, Esq;

*Quis Martem tunicâ tectum Adamantinâ dignè scripserit?*

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# *To the* READER.

HAving had the *Manuſcript* of this *Treatiſe*, Written by Sir *Walter Raleigh*, many years in my hands, and finding it lately by chance among other Books and Papers, upon reading thereof, I thought it a kinde of injury to withhold longer the work of ſo eminent an Author from the Publick; it being both anſwerable in

Stile to other Works of his already Extant, as far as the subject would permit, and given me for a true Copy by a Learned Man at his Death, who had Collected several such peices.

*John Milton.*

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THE

# THE
# Principal Contents.

## CHAP. I.

*THe Definition and Diviſion of Publick Weals and Soveraign States, according to their ſeveral Species or Kindes.* Pag. 1.

Chap. 2. *Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government, with its eſſential Marks, and ſpecifical Differences.* Pag. 2.

Chap. 3. *Of Monarchies Seignioriſe, exemplified in the Turkiſh and Weſt-Indian Empire.* Pag. 5.

Chap. 4. *Of Monarchies Royal, with the Means to maintain them.* Pag. 7.

Chap. 5. *Of Monarchies Tyrannical.* Pag. 9.

Chap. 6. *Of new-found Monarchies and Prin-*

*Principalities, with the Means to perpetuate them.* Pag. 10.

Chap. 7. *Of Counsils and Counsellors in general.* Pag. 14.

Chap. 8. *Of Councils in some particular Monarchies, Aristocraties and Democraties.* Pag. 15.

Chap. 9. *Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions.* Pag. 17.

Chap. 10. *Of Magistrates, their Qualifications and Elections.* Pag. 18.

Chap. 11. *Observations intrinsically concerning every Publick State in Points of Justice, Treasure, and War.* P. 20.

Chap. 12. *Extrinsick Observations, shewing how to deal with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively, how to prevent their Designs, and decypher their Intendments.* Pag. 24.

Chap. 13. *Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities, characterizing an excellent Prince or Governor.* Pag. 28.

Chap. 14. *Of the Princes intimate Counsellors and Ministers of State, with*

*with their ſeveral Requiſites.* Pag. 32.
Chap. 15. *The Art of Ruling, or Myſtery of Regiment.* Pag. 38.
Chap. 16. *Of Princely Authority; wherein it conſiſts, and how far to be extended and delegated.* Pag. 40.
Chap. 17. *Of Power and Force; and how to be raiſed and maintained.* P. 42.
Chap. 18. *Of Conſpiracy and Treaſon; with the cauſes and ways of prevention or diſcovery.* Pag. 44.
Chap. 19. *Of Publick Hate and Contempt, with the occaſions and means to redreſs and avoid it.* Pag. 47.
Chap. 20. *Of Diffidence and Diſſimulation in the mannage of State Affairs.* Pag. 54.
Chap. 21. *Of War Defenſive and Invaſive; with Inſtructions touching Laws of Arms, Soldiers, and Military Diſcipline.* Pag. 56.
Chap. 22. *Of Generals and Commanders, and their requiſite Abilities in Martial enterpriſes and expeditions.* Pag. 67.
Chap. 23. *Of Councils in War, and Directions Tactick and Stratagematick;*

*with*

*with advice how to make an honorable Peace.* Pag. 71.

Chap. 24. *Of Civil War, with the Causes and Remedies thereof.* Pag. 80.

Chap. 25. *A Collection of Political Observations (confirmed by Reason and Experience) advertising Princes, Statesmen, and private persons how to demean themselves in all Fortunes and Events.* Pag. 88.

Chap. 26. *Maximes of State, or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts, concerning all Estates, and forms of Policy in times of Peace or War, &c. confirmed by select Narrations, and Historical Parallels.* Pag. 153.

THE

# THE *Cabinet-Council:* Containing the chief Arts of EMPIRE, AND Mysteries of State.

## CHAP. I.

*The Definition and Division of Publick Weales and Soveraign States, according to their several Species or kinds.*

A Common-wealth is a certain Soveraign Government of many Families, with those things that are common among them.

All Common-wealths are either { Monarchies, Aristocraties, Democraties.

A Monarchie is that State where the Soveraignty

veraignty reſteth in the perſon of one only Prince.

An Ariſtocratie, is where ſome ſmall part of the people have in them as a body corporate, the Soveraignty and ſupream power of the whole State.

A Democratie, is where all the people have Power and Authority Soveraign.

So doth it appear, that the place and perſon where the Soveraigntie reſteth, doth cauſe the State to be either a Monarchie, an Ariſtocratie, or Popular Government.

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## CHAP. II.

### *Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government, with its Eſſential markes, and Specifical differences.*

SOveraigntie is an abſolute and perpetual power in every publike State and he is properly and only a Soveraign, that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, perſon or power, but God and his own ſword.

The Firſt mark of Soveraigntie is abſolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general, and every of them in particular, without conſent of any other perſon

ſon or perſons, either greater or inferior to himſelf.

The Second mark of Majeſty is Authority to make War, and conclude Peace at his pleaſure.

The Third is Power to beſtow all Honors and cheif Offices at his pleaſure.

The Fourth marke of Soveraigntie is Appellation.

The Fifth mark and laſt, is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwiſe condemned in Life, Lands, Goods, or Honors.

Theſe Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magiſtrate, but in the Princes abſence, and for ſome urgent occaſion.

Monarchies are of three ſorts { Signioril, Royal, Tyrannical.

The Diverſitie of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State, but the diverſe proceedings of thoſe Princes that governe; for great difference there may be between the nature of the Common wealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that giveth the Magiſtracies, Honors and Offices without reſpect of Nobility, Riches or Vertue, may be ſaid to governe popularly. And that Monarchy may be ſaid to be

governed Ariſtocratically, when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich men only.

The ſame difference there is to be found in States Ariſtocratical and Popular: for the one and the other may be both Signioril, or Tyrannical.

A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and juſt War, is made owner of mens bodies and goods, and governeth them as a Maſter of a Familie governeth baſe Servants and Slaves.

A Monarch Royal, is he whoſe Subjects are obedient unto his Laws, and the Monarch himſelf obeyeth the Lawes of God and Nature, ſuffering every Subject to enjoy liberty natural, with property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father governeth his Children.

A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Free-men as Slaves, and uſeth their Lands and Goods as his own.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Monarchie Signioril, Exemplified in the Turkiſh and Weſt-Indian Empire.*

ALL people ſubject to Princes, are governed as Free-men by their Prince and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Princes Commiſſion but by antient Lawes or Cuſtom have Inheritance and Tenements; or elſe they are by one Prince and his Miniſters commanded; which Miniſters have not by Law, or Ordinance, any Authority or Intereſt of themſelves, but being like to the people ( baſe men and ſlaves ) they command only by Commiſſion in the Princes name; and the Authority of thoſe Miniſters doth ceaſe at the Princes pleaſure, ſo that the people doe not acknowledg any ſuperior but the Prince, nor owe any ſervice to other mean Lords: So as all the people ſtand without propertie in Lands or Goods; for example, the Empire of Turky and the Weſt Indies.

The Provinces of this Monarchie are allotted to ſundrie Magiſtrates or Miniſters,

and they altered and removed at the Princes pleasure; but it is otherwise in a Monarchie Royal, because the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords. And albeit those mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Tenants who may not without just cause be dispossessed by the Prince; and those people having had dependency of their Lords and their Ancestors, do ever beare unto them a certain naturall love and dutifull respect: who so therefore compareth these Principalities, shall perceive, that to Conquer a State Signioril there is great difficultie; but being conquered, it may easily be maintained for the difficultie to conquer such a State, proceedeth from the lack of mean Lords to call in and assist the Prince that doth invade: who therefore desireth to subdue a Nation thus governed, must of force assault all the people, and rather trust in his own strength then the aide of the Country. But if he can prevaile, then one only feare remaineth, which is the Princes posteritie, which necessarily must be extinguished, because the Princes race only hath interest both in the People and Soldiers. But to enter a Monarchy Royal, is an enterprise of no great difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the friendship and aide of some

mean

mean Lords to take his part, and prepar the place where he is to arrive.

## CHAP. IIII.

### *Of Monarchies Royal, with the means to maintaine them.*

MOnarchies Royal, are for the moſt part antient and hereditary, and conſequently eaſie to be governed. For it is ſufficient for the Prince to maintain the old Laws, and on occaſion temporize with thoſe accidents that happen: ſuch a State cannot be taken from the Prince without exceſſive force, and if it be, it ſhall be ſoon recovered. Example, *England* and *France*.

But if a Monarchie newly conquered, be annexed unto an old, and not properly antient, then is it with much more difficulty maintained.

Firſt, for that men naturally inclined to variation are eaſily induced to take arms againſt him that newly governeth.

Secondly, every new Prince is forced to exact aſwell upon thoſe Subjects that joyned with him as thoſe that did reſiſt him, and therefore ſhall offend both. Example, *Ireland annexed to the Crown of England: Sicilia and Naples to Spaine.* The

The means to maintain ſuch a Monarchie, is,

Firſt to extinguiſh the race of him that was anciently Prince.

Secondly, to continue all Lawes and Cuſtomes in the former force; for ſo ſhall the Subject find nothing altered but the Prince, and therefore will ſoon reſt contented: and the rather if that new Monarchie and the antient dominion of the Prince be of one Language: But if the people be of a contrary Language and humor, then to hold it, there needeth great induſtrie and fortune: in that caſe the beſt way is that the Prince ſhould inhabit there, as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the Subject, as to preſerve the people from oppreſſion of his own Miniſters. Another way is to ſend thither certain Colonies, and plant them in fit places, or elſe to ſettle ſome gariſons both of horſe and foot; but Colonies are leſs chargeable to the Prince: As for the people inhabitant (who muſt neceſſarily remove, they being a ſmall number and diſpoſſeſſed) they cannot have power to offend: for in that caſe, this Rule or Maxime ſhall be found true, that men muſt be either kindly intreated, or with all extremity oppreſſed; becauſe of light injuries they may be revenged, but of utter oppreſſion they cannot.

A Third way to hold a conquered dominion, is, to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power, and oppress or keep under those that are most potent; and above all to take order that no forraign Prince or power doe enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the nation as are discontented, either for ambition or feare, will be ever readie to bring in strangers; and to conclude this matter of Principalitie annexed, I say it behoveth every Prince possessed of such a State, never to increase the power of any potent neighbor, never to oppress those that are of small power, never to permit any forraign potentate to enter, but ever to plant Colonies and Garisons, or else to make that dominion his cheif habitation.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of Monarchies Tyrannical.*

TYrannical Princes are not advanced by favor, neither doe they trust unto Fortune, but by degrees of Warr, or else by some other indirect meanes do aspire unto greatness; and therein do maintain themselves by all wayes either honest or dis-

honest,

honeſt, without reſpect of Juſtice, Conſcience or Law either of Nations or Nature: A Prince by ſuch impious means aſpired, and deſiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, ſuddenly, and as it were at an inſtant; For if they be exeented at leaſure and by piecemeale, then will the Princes fears continue long, and the terror in Subjects take deeper impreſſion, whoſe nature is ſuch that either they muſt be bound by benefits, or by cruelty made ſure from offending; Example, *Dionyſius* and *Agathocles.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of new found Monarchies and Principalities, with the means to perpetuate them.*

SOme other Princes there are that from privateEſtate have aſpired to Soveraignty not by unnatural or impious proceedings asthe former, but by vertue and fortune, and being aſpired have found no great difficulty to be maintained; for ſuch a Prince having no other dominion, is forced to ſettle himſelf where he is become a Prince; But here

is

is to be noted that albeit such a man be vertuous, yet wanting fortune, his vertue proveth to small purpose, and fortune without vertue doth seldome work any great effect. Howsoever it bé, a Prince being aspired, both by the aide of the one and of the other, shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten: becaus he is forced to introduce new Lawes and new Orders of government differing from the old, aswell for his own security, as confirmation of the Government: for avoiding of which dangers he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compell his Subjects to obey, or must pray in aide of others; If he can doe the first, he needeth not doubt; but being driven to the other, his greatness cannot long continue; for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people, yet to make them constant, is a work well neer impossible. Example, *Theseus*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*. The Second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption, or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends: A Prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his Estate, must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other: which may be done by this means; First, to assure all enemies from offending.

fending. Secondly, to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may. Thirdly to compass all designes tending to his honor or profit, and bring them to pass either by fraud or force: Fourthly, to make himself honoured and followed of Captains and Soldiers. Fifthly, to oppress all those that would or can offend. Sixthly to be obsequious & liberal to frinds, magnanimous & terrible to Foes. Seventhly, to casse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new. Eighthly, to hold such Amitie with Kings and Princes, as they ought reasonablie to favor him, or else they would offend; easily they cannot. Example, *Giovannie, Torrigiani, Cæsar Borgia.*

The Third and last meanes whereby private persons doe aspire to Principalities, is not force and violence, but meer good-will and favor of men. The cause or occasion thereof, is only vertue, or fortune, or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness; because he aspireth either by favor of the People, or by favor of the Nobilitie; for these contrary humors are in all Common wealths to be found. And the reason thereof is, that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people, and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers appetites one of these three

effects

effects doe proceed, viz. Principalitie, Liberty, or Licencious life. Principality may come either by love of the multitude, or of the great men: for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a Prince, hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended. Example, *Francesco Sforza*, *Alessandro de Medici*.

A Prince in this sort aspired, to maintain his Estate, must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced: for if by favor of great men he be aspired, then must he meet with many difficulties, for having about him divers persons of great qualitie, and such as were but lately his equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth; But if the Prince be advanced by the people, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a Prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the Nobilitie preferreth: for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own, and to be defended from oppression; but great men doe studie not only to hold their own; but also to command and insult upon inferiors.

*Note that all Monarchies are Principalities,*

*But all Principalities are not Monarchies.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Councils, and Counſellors in general.*

A Senate or Council is a certain lawful aſſembly of Counſellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon Weale Power Soveraign.

A Counſellor is called in the Latine *Senator*; which word ſignifieth in effect an old man: The *Grecians* and *Romans* alſo moſt commonly compoſed their Councils of ancient and expert perſons; for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men, then might the Council have more properly bin called a Juvenate then a *Senate*.

The chief and moſt neceſſary note required in a Counſellor is to have no dependance of any other Prince or Commonweale; either Oath, Homage, Natural obligation, Pention, or reward: In this point the *Venetians* have bin ever moſt preciſe, and for that reaſon, doe not admit any Cardinal or other Clergieman to be either of or

at their Councils, therefore when the *Venetian* Senate is aſſembled, the Uſher being ready to ſhut the dore cryeth aloud, *Fuora Preti*, Depart Prieſt. Note alſo that in every ſtate of what quality ſoever, a ſecret or Cabinet-Council is mainly neceſſary.

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## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Councils in ſome particular Monarchies, Ariſtocraties, and Democraties.*

THe King of *Spaine*, for the government of his Dominions hath ſeven Councils (*viz*) the Council of the *Indies*, the Council of *Spaine*, the Council of *Italy* and the Low Countries, the Council of War, the Council of Orders, the Council of Inquiſition, and the Council Royal.

In *France* are three Councils (*viz*) the Council Privy, the Council of Judges, which they call Preſidents *et Conceliers de Parlament*, and the great Council which they call *aſſemblei du troys eſtates*.

### *Of Councils in Ariſtocraties.*

In *Venice* beſide the Senate and great Council,

Council are four Councils (*viz*) the Sages of the Sea, the Sages of the Land, the Connci of Tenn, the three presidents of Quarantia, and the Senate: All which Councils do amount to 120 persons, with the Magistrates.

The great Council of *Ragusa* consisteth of 60 persons, and hath another privie Council of 12.

### *Of Councils in Democraties.*

*Genoua* hath 3 Councils; the great Council of 200, the Senate which consisteth of 60, and the privie Council which hath 26 Counsellors: so it doth appear that in all Commonwealths, be they Monarchies, Aristocracies, or Popular States, The Council-privie is most necessarie and often used; Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies, and the Councils in *Aristocracies* and States Popular; that is to say, that all deliberations fit to be published, are in a Monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the Council privie, and after ratified by Common Council; But in Optimacies or popular government the Custom is contrary.

Here also is to be noted that albeit the use and Authority of every Senate and Privie

Council

Councel is moſt needful, yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of thoſe in whom the Soveraignty reſteth; for if Councellors had power to command abſolutely, then ſhould they be Soveraigns, and conſequently all execution at their pleaſure; which may not be without detracting from Majeſtie, which is a thing ſo ſoveraign and ſacred, as no Citizen or Subject of what quality ſoever, may touch or approach thereunto.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Officers and Commiſſioners with their reſpective Diſtinctions.*

AN Officer is a perſon publick, that hath charge ordinary and limited by Law.

A Commiſſioner is alſo a perſon publick, but his charge is extraordinary and limited by Commiſſion.

Officers are of two ſorts, and ſo be Commiſſioners; the one hath power to command, and are called Magiſtrates; the other hath authority to execute: ſo the one and the other are perſons publick: yet are not all publick perſons either Officers or Commiſſioners.

Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces, in Warr, in Justice, in disposing the Treasure, or some other Function concerning the State; but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Soveraign, Magistrates, and Commissioners. And here is to be noted that every Commission ceaseth if he that granted the Commission doth dye, or revoke it, or if the Commissioners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equall to his that made it.

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## CHAP. X.

### *Of Magistrates, their Qualifications and Elections.*

A Magistrate is an Officer having power to command in the State; and albeit that every Magistrate be an Officer, yet every Officer is not a Magistrate, but they only that have power to command.

Also in making of Officers and Magistrates in every Commonweale, three things are specially to be observed (*viz.*) who doth make them, what men they are that should be made, and the forme and manner how they are made.

The first appertaineth to him or them in whom

whom the Soveraigntie resteth; the second also belongeth to Majestie; yet therein the Laws are commonly followed, especially in *Aristocracies* and States popular; In the one the Magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble: In the other, elected out of the whole multitude.

The forme and manner of chooſing Magistrates in *Aristocracies* and States Popular, is either by election, by lot, or by both, and their Office is to compel those that doe not obey what Soveraigntie commandeth: for all force of Commandment lyeth in compulsion.

Commandment likewise is of two sorts: the one may be called Soveraign and absolute, above Lawes, above Magistrates, and above people. In Monarchies such command is proper to the Prince only; in *Aristocracies* it resteth in the Nobility: and in *Democracies* the people have that power.

The second Commandments are Subject both to Soveraignty and Law.

Here is to be noted that every Magistrate may recall his own Commandement, and forbid what he did Command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath Judged.

* Also in presence of the Soveraign, all Authority of Magistrates ceaseth; and in presence of great Magistrates the inferior have

* Commissions determine in presence of him that granted them.

no power; and Magiſtrates equall cannot doe any thing but by conſent, if his Colleagues or fellow-Magiſtrates be preſent.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Obſervations intrinſically concerning every publick State in points of Juſtice, Treaſure, and Warr.*

THe First concern matter Intrinſick.
The Second touch matter Extrinſick.

*Matters Intrinſick are three.*

The Adminiſtration of Juſtice.
The Mannaging of the Treaſure.
The diſpoſing of things appertaining to War.

*Matters Extrinſick are alſo three.*

The skill how to deale with neighbours.
The diligence to vent their deſignes.
The way how to win ſo much confidence with ſome of them, as to be made partaker of whatſoever they mean to enterpriſe.

*Touching Adminiſtration of Juſtice.*

The

The good and direct Administration of Justice, is in all places a Principal part of government; for seldome or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration, where Justice is equally administred without respect of persons; and in every State this consideration is required, but most of all in Countries that doe front upon other Princes, or were lately conquered: Hereunto the Princes vigilancy and the Magistrates uprightness are especially required; for oftentimes the Prince is deceived, and the Magistrates corrupted; it behoveth also the Prince to maintain the Judges and Ministers of Justice in their reputation, and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings, and the rather if their Authority doe include equity, and from their censure be no appeale; and if their Office be during life, and they are men born and dwelling in the same Country; all these things are duly to be considered of the Prince; for as to call the Judges into question, is as it were to disgrace the Judicial seate; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the Subject; in this case therefore the Prince cannot doe more then by his wisdom to make choise of good men; and being chosen, to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary

course of Justice may proceed; for otherwise great disorder, contempt, and general confusion will ensue thereof. Secondly he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings; and Lastly to reserve unto himself a supream power of Appellation.

*Touching the Treasure.*

The want of money is in all States very perilous, and most of all in those which are of least strength, and doe confine upon Nations with whom they have commonly War, or unassured peace, but most perilous of all to those Governments which are remote from the Prince, or place where they are to be relieved.

*The means to leavie Treasure are four.*

First, the Customs and Impositions upon all sorts of Merchandize and Traffique is to be looked unto and advanced.

Secondly, the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed.

Thirdly, all superfluous charges and expences are to be taken away.

Lastly, the doings and accounts of Ministers are severally to be examined.

Touching the matter of Custom and Impost,

poſt, thereof aſſuredly a great profit is in every State to be raiſed; chiefly where Peace hath long continued, and where the Country affordeth much plenty of Commodities to be carried out, and where ports are to receive ſhipping.

The moderating of Intereſt is ever neceſſary, and chiefly in this age, by reaſon that money aboundeth in *Europe*; ſince the Trafficke into the Indies; for ſuch men as have money in their hands great plenty, would in no wiſe imploy the ſame in Merchandize, if lawful it were to receive the utmoſt uſury, being a courſe of moſt profit and greateſt ſecurity.

The taking away of ſuperfluous expences is no other thing then a certain wiſe and laudable parſimony; which the *Romans* and other well governed States did uſe. Theſe expences conſiſt in Fees, Allowances, and Wages granted to Miniſters of little or no neceſſity; alſo in Penſions, Rewards, Entertainmens and Donaries, with ſmall difficultie to be moderated, or eaſily to be ſuppreſſed.

* By abridging or taking away of theſe needleſs expences a marvelous profit will be ſaved for the Prince, but if he continue them, and by impoſing upon the people doe think to increaſe his Treaſure or Revenew, beſides

*So *Henry* the 4 of *France* by putting his Courtiers to boord-wages was ſaid to make mony with his Teeth.

sides the loss of their love, he may also hazard their obedience, with many other inconveniences.

### *Touching War.*

Whatsoever Prince or Commonweale is Neighbor to any people which can, will, or were wont to offend, it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his Person and Country, but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence: for the inconveniencies which happen to government, are suddain and unlookt for; yea the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other waies imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war.

## CHAP. XII.

*Extrinsick observation, shewing how to deale with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively, how to prevent their designes, and decypher their intendments.*

THis first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good, but otherwise becometh

cometh dangerous; for the proceeding must be diverſe according to the diverſitie of the ends which the Prince or Governor intendeth; for if he deſire to continue peace with his Neighbors, one way is to be taken; but otherwiſe he is to work that ſeeketh occaſion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbors. If he do deſire to live peaceably with all, then he is to obſerve theſe Rules (*viz.*)

Firſt, to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations

Secondly, to ſhew himſelf reſolved neither to offer nor take the leaſt touch of wrong or injury.

Thirdly, with all care and favor to further Commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the Subject, and increaſe of the Princes Revenue.

Fourthly, covertly to win ſo great confidence with Neighbors, as in all actions of unkindneſs among them he may be made Umpire.

Fifthly, to become ſo well beleeved with them as he may remove ſuch diffidences as grow to his own diſadvantage.

Sixthly, not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakeſt, and cheifly ſuch as do and will endure his fortune.

Laſtly, in Favouring, Aiding, and Protecting

tecting ( unleſs neceſſity ſhall otherwiſe require ) to do it moderately, ſo as they who are to be aided, become not Jealous, and conſequently ſeek Adherency elſwhere, which ofttimes hath opened way to other Neighbors that deſire a like occaſion.

### *How to prevent their deſignes.*

This Point in time of War is with great diligence to be looked unto; alſo in time of Peace to prevent all occaſions that may kindle Warr is behoveful; for to foreſee what may happen to the prejudice of a Princes Profit or Reputation, is a part of great Wiſdom. The means to attain the Intelligence of theſe things are two.

The Firſt is by Friends, the next by Eſpials; the one for the moſt part faithfull, the other not ſo aſſured

Theſe matters are well to be conſidered; for albeit the nature of man deſireth nothing more then curiouſly to know the doings of others, yet are thoſe things to be handled with ſo great ſecrecy and diſſimulation as the Princes intent be not in any wiſe ſuſpected, nor the Miniſters made odious; for theſe ſometimes to win themſelves reputation, do deviſe cauſes of difference where no need is, divining of things future

which

which prove to the prejudice of their own Prince.

### *To win Confidence with Neighbours.*

This is chiefly attained unto by being Loved and Honored; for these things do work so many good effects, as daily experience sufficeth without any expres Example to prove them of great force.

The waies to win Love and Trust, is in all Actions to proceed Justly, and sometimes to wink at Wrongs, or set aside unnecessary revenges; and if any thing be done not justifiable, or unfit to be allowed, as oftentimes it happneth, there to lay the blame upon the Minister, which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation by reproving and punishing the Minister, as the Princes offended may be satisfied, and beleive that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence.

Now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching Provision, to the end the people may not be drawn into despaire by Famine or extream Dearth of Victual, and chiefly for want of Corne, which is one Principal Consideration to be regarded, according to the Italian Proverb, *Pane in Piazza, Giustitia in Palazzo, sive-*

*rezza*

*rezza per tutto*: whereunto I could wish every Prince or Supream Governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) *Facile de audienza: non facile de credenza, desioso de spedition, essemplare in costunii proprii, & inquei de sua casa tale chevorra governare, e non esser governato da altro; he della raggione.*

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities, Characterring an excellent Prince or Governor.*

EVery good and lawful principality is either elective or succeſſive: Of them, election ſeemeth the more ancient; but ſucceſſion in divers reſpects the better; *Minore diſcrimine ſumitur Princeps quam quæritur. Tac.*

The chief and only endeavor of every good Prince, ought to be the commodity and ſecurity of the Subjects; as contrarywiſe the Tyrant ſeeketh his own private profit with the oppreſſion of his people. *Civium non ſervitus ſed tutela tradita eſt. Sal.*

To the perfection of every good Prince, two things are neceſſarily required

red (*viz.*) Prudence and Vertue; the one to direct his doings, the other to governe his life. *Rex erit ſi recte feceris. Hor.*

The ſecond care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himſelf; for thereby he is not only honored, but they alſo the better governed; *Facile imperium in bonos. Plaut.*

Subjects are made good by two meanes (*viz.*) by conſtraint of law, and the Princes example; for in all eſtates, the people do imitate thoſe conditions whereunto they ſee the Prince enclined; *Quiquid faciunt principes, præcipere videantur. Quintil.*

All vertues be required in a Prince, but juſtice and clemencie are moſt neceſſary; for juſtice is a habit of doing things Juſtly, as well to himſelf as others, and giving to every one ſo much as to him appertaineth; This is that vertue that preſerveth concord among men, and whereof they be called good: *Jus & equitas vincula civitatum: Cic.*

* It is the quality of this vertue alſo to proceed equally and temperately; it informeth the Prince not to ſurcharge the Subjects with infinite laws; for thereof proceedeth the impoveriſhment of the Subjects and the inriching of Lawyers, a kind of men which in

*The author of the Epiſtle Dedicatory to the Dutcheſſe of *Suffolk*, prefixt to Mr. *Latimer* ſermons, ſaith that Lawyers coveteouſneſs hath almoſt devoured *England*.

in ages more antient, did ſeem of no neceſſity: *Sine cauſidicis ſatis fœlices olim fuere futuraque ſunt urbes. Sal.*

The next vertue required in Princes is Clemency, being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compaſſion, yet tempered with ſeverity and judgment; this quality is fit for all great perſonages, but chiefly Princes, becauſe their occaſion to uſe it is moſt; by it alſo the love of men is gained; *Qui vult regnare, languida regnet manu. Sen.*

After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain performance and obſervation of word and promiſe; this vertue ſeemeth to accompany Juſtice, or is as it were the ſame, and therefore moſt fit for Princes: *Sanctiſſimum generis humani bonum. Liv.*

As Fidelity followeth Juſtice, ſo doth Modeſty accompany Clemency; Modeſty is a temperature of reaſon, whereby the mind of man is ſo governed, as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himſelf, or any thing that is his; a qualitie not common in fortunate folk; and moſt rare in Princes. *Superbia commune nobilitatis malum. Sal.*

This vertue doth alſo moderate all external demonſtration of Inſolence, Pride, and Arro-

Arrogance, and therefore neceſſary to be known of Princes, and all others whom Favor or Fortune have advanced : *Impone ſælicitati tuæ fræno, facilius illam reges. Curt.*

But as Princes are to obſerve the bounds of Modeſty, ſo may they not forget the the Majeſty appertaining to their ſupream honor, being a certain reverend greatneſs due to princely vertue and royal State ; A grace and gravity no leſſe beſeeming a Prince then vertue it ſelf ; for neither overmuch familiarity, nor too great auſteritie ought to be uſed by Princes : *Facilitas auctoritatem, ſeveritas amorem minuit. Tac.*

To theſe vertues we may apply Liberality, which doth not only adorn, but highly advance the honor due to Princes ; thereby alſo the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a Princes nature then Bounty, the ſame being accompanied with judgment, and performed according to the laws of liberality ; *Perdere multi ſciunt, donare neſciunt. Tac.*

It ſeemeth alſo that Prudence is not only fit, but alſo among other vertues neceſſary in a Prince; for the daily uſe thereof is in all humane actions required, and chiefly in matters of State and Government. *Prudentia*

*rid imperantis propria et unica virtus. Ariſt.*

The ſucceſs of all worldly proceedings doth ſhew that prudence hath compaſſed the proſperous event of humane actions, more then force of arms or other power. *Mens una ſapiens plurium vincit manus. Eurip.*

Prudence is either natural, or received from others; for who ſo can counſel himſelf what is fit to be done, needeth not the advice of others; But they that want ſuch perfection, and are nevertheleſs capable, and are willing to know what others informe, ought to be accompted wiſe enough: *Laudatiſſimus eſt qui cuncta vidibit, ſed laudandus eſt is qui paret recte monenti. Heſiod.*

## CHAP. XIIII.

### *Of the Princes intimate Counſellors and Miniſters of State, with their ſeveral Requiſites.*

ALbeit the excellent ſpirit of ſome Princes be ſuch as doth juſtly deſerve the higheſt commendation; yet for that every courſe of life needeth the aid of men, and

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the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care apertaining to publick affairs; it behooveth Princes to be assisted: *Magna negocia, adjutoribus egent. Tac.*

These assistants may be properly divided into Counsellors and Ministers; the one to advise, the other to execute: without Counsel, no Kingdom, no State, no private house can stand; for, experience hath proved that Common weals have prospered so long as good counsell did governe, but when favor, fear, or voluptuosnes entred, those nations became disordered; and in the end subject to slavery: *Quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio. Plato.*

Counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to Princes or Commonwealths, as well in peace as in war: the chief qualities required in such men, are Fidelity and Knowledg; which two concurring do make them both good and wise, and consequently fit for Counsel; *Prudentis proprium munus rectè consulere. Arist.*

The election of Counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience, and grave years; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune, and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consul-

tation : *Conſilia ſenum, facta juvenum. Plato.*

Albeit we ſay that the excellency of wiſdom ſhould be in Counſellors ; yet do we not require ſo quick and fiery a conceipt as is more apt for innovation then orderly government. *Hebetiores quàm acutiores melius Remp. adminiſtrant. Thucyd.*

To Fidelity and Experience we wiſh that our Councellors ſhould be endued with Piety, Liberty, Conſtancy, Modeſty, and Silence ; for as the aid and aſſiſtance of God is that which governeth all good counſels, ſo liberty of ſpeech and magnanimus uttering of what is good and fit, is neceſſary in Counſellors. Likewiſe to be conſtant and not to varie in opinion, either for feare or favor, is very commendable: Alſo as modeſty in giving Counſel eſcheweth all offences, and gaineth good will ; ſo ſecrecy is the beſt and moſt ſecure meanes to govern all publick affairs : *Res magnæ ſuſtineri non poſſunt ab eo qui tacere nequit. Curt.*

The firſt obſtacle to good Counſel is Pertinacy or Opiniativeneſs, a condition far unfit for Counſellors; yet ſome men are ſo far in love with their own Opiniaſtre conceipts as that they cannot patiently endure oppoſition. Secondly, Diſcord muſt from Counſellors be removed, becauſe private offence

many

many times impeacheth publick proceedings. Thirdly affection is an enemy to counſel, the ſame being commonly accompanied with anger, wherewith nothing can be rightly or conſiderately done. Laſtly Avarice ſeemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all Counſellors becauſe it driveth away both Fidelity and Honeſty, the principall pillars of all good counſell: *Peſſimum veri affectus et judicii venenum, utilitas. Tac.*

To good Counſell other impediments there are, which ſquare not with wiſdom; for all crafty and hazarding Counſells do ſeem in the beginning likely to ſucceed; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event. It therefore ſeemeth behoveſull to be wary in reſolving, and bold in executing: *Animus vereri quiſcit, ſcit tutò aggredi. Pub.*

An other let to good conſultation is immoderate deſire, which every wiſe man muſt endeavor to reſtrain. *Cupiditate pauca rectè fiunt, circumſpectione plurima: Thucyd.*

Thirdly haſte, is an Enemy to good deliberation; for whoſo greedily deſireth any thing, proceedeth raſhly; and raſh proceeding endeth ever in repentance. *Scelera impetu, bona conſilia morâ valeſcunt. Tac.*

## *Of Miniſters of State.*

Having already ſpoken of Counſellors, ſomwhat is to be ſpoken of Miniſters; I mean thoſe that either publickly or privately ſerve the Prince in any function; in choice of which men, care muſt be had, Firſt that they be perſon honeſtly born; for no man deſcended of baſe parentage may be admitted, unleſs in him be found ſome noble and excellent vertue; *Optimus quiſque Nobiliſſimus. Plato.*

— Secondly, they ought to be of honeſt condition, and of good fame; for that commonweal is better and more ſecure, where the Prince is not good, then is that where his Miniſters are evill. It ſeemeth therefore that Miniſters ſhould be men of good quality and blameleſſe. *Emitur ſola virtute poteſtas. Claud.*

Thirdly, conſideration is to be had of their Capacity and fitneſs; for that Function wherein they are to be uſed; for as ſome men are apt for learning, ſo others are naturally diſpoſed to arms. Alſo it is neceſſary that every one ſquare with the office whereuntoh e is appointed, in which matter ſome Princes have uſed great caution; for as they little liked of men excellent, ſo they utterly

ly deteſted the vitious; the one they doubted to truſt in regard of themſelves, the other were thought a publick indignity to the State. VViſe men have therefore reſolved that thoſe witts which are neither over haughty and ſingular, nor they which be baſe or dull are fitteſt for Princes ſecrets and ſervices; howſoever we may hereof ſay with *Tacitus* : *Neſcio quomodo Aulica haec comitia affectus dirigit, et fato quodam ac ſorte naſcendi, ut cætera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offenſio in illos eſt. Tac.*

And becauſe the courſe and quality of mens lives ſerving in Court, is of all other the moſt uncertain and dangerous, great heed and circumſpection ought therein to be uſed; for whoſo ſerveth negligently forgetting the dutifull endeavors appertaining to the place, ſeemeth to take a way of no good ſpeed : *Quanto quis obſequio promptior, tanto honoribus et opibus extollitur. Tac.*

It ſhall alſo become ſuch a man to look well unto his own profit and behave himſelf rather boldly then baſhfully : *Malus miniſter Regis imperii pudor. Sen.*

To be modeſt, and cloſely to handle all actions; is alſo a courſe well beſeeming a Courtier; neither ſhall he do well to attribute any good ſucceſs to his own vertue or

merit, but acknowledg all to proceed from the Princes bounty and goodneſs, by which meanes envy is eſchewed, and the Prince not robbed of his honor. *Hæc eſt conditio Regum, caſus tantum adverſos hominibus tribuant, ſecundos virtuti ſuæ. Prov. Emped.*

And to conclude theſe precepts ſummarily, I ſay it behooveth all miniſters and ſervants in Court to be patient, wary and of few words; *Fraudum ſedes Aula. Sen.*

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## CHAP. XV.

### *The Art of ruling, or Myſtery of Regiment.*

TO governe, is a certain skill how to command and continue Subjects in due obedience, ſo as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two ſpeciall things are to be conſidered (*viz*) the nature of Men, and the nature of the State, but firſt the condition of the vulgar muſt be well conceived; *Noſcenda natura vulgi, et quibus modis temperanter habeatur. Tac.*

The diſpoſition of divers men is, ſome are apt to anger, ſome are hardy, ſome fearful; it therefore behooveth the Prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people

people whom he governeth : *Principis eſt virtus maxima noſſe ſuos. Mart.*

Likewiſe the nature of Commonweals is mutable and ſubject to change, and Kings are not only accompanied with fortune, but alſo followed with hate, which breedeth a continuall diffidence, chiefly towards thoſe that are neareſt to Majeſty : *Suſpectus ſemper inviſuſque dominantibus quiſquis proximus deſtinatur. Tac.*

Moreover the vulgar ſort is generally variable, raſh, hardy, and void of judgment ; *ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat. Cic.*

To confirm a Government, force and armes are of greateſt neceſſity ; by force I mean the guards and armes which Princes uſe for their defence or ornament ; *Miles in foro, Miles in curia principem comitari debet. Tac.*

To this may be added fortification and ſtrong buildings, in theſe days much uſed by new Princes, and others alſo to whom people yield, not willing obedience. In ancient times Princes planted Colonies as well to ſuppreſs rebellion in conquered Countries, as to front ſuſpected neighbors : *Coloniæ vera ſedes ſervitutis. Tac.*

The government of Princes is alſo greatly increaſed by a vertue, which I call a commen-

mendable affection in Subjects, proceeding of love and authority: These effects do grow from the Princes own merit, but their being liveth in the mind of the People; this love is gained by lenity, liberality, and mercy; yet is every of them to be tempered: *Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem humilitate captabis. Plin.*

Affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality, the same being used with Judgment and Moderation. *Bellorum sociis, periculorum consortibus, sive de te benè ac fortiter —— —— meritis. Sen.*

By Indulgence likewise and Princely affability the love of men is gained; for the multitude desire no more then necessary food, and liberty to use ordinary recreations: *Vulgo, sicut pueris, omne Indicrum in pretio est. Sen.*

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Princely Authority; wherein it consists, and how far to be extended and delegated.*

AUthority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of Subjects and others touching the Princes vertue and government;

nent; it reſteth cheifly in admiration and fear - *Ingenita quibuſdam gentibus erga reges ſuos veneratio. Curt.*

Authority conſiſteth in three things; (*viz.*)the form of Government, the ſtrength of the Kingdom, and the condition of the Prince; for in them all reputation and ſecurity reſteth: *Majeſtas imperii, ſalutis tutela. Curt.*

Whoſo deſireth to governe well, it behoveth him to uſe ſeverity, conſtancy, and reſtraint; for over much lenity introduceth contempt, and certain hope of impunity; the condition of men being ſuch as cannot be reſtrained by ſhame, yet it is to be commanded by fear: *Salutaris ſeveritas vincit inanem ſpeciem clementiæ. Cic.*

Yet ought ſeverity to be uſed with great reſpect and ſparingly, becauſe over great terror breedeth deſperation: *Pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat. Cic.*

To governe conſtantly is nothing elſe but to continue the old and antient laws in force without change or innovation unles exceeding great commodity or urgent neceſſity ſhall ſo require: for where extream puniſhments are uſed, reformation is always needfull; *Nocet interdum priſcus rigor & nimia ſeveritas. Tac.*

Alſo to reſtrain Authority is a matter of great

great neceſſity and worthy a wiſe Prince; elſe he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himſelf only due, the ſame being alſo dangerous: *Periculoſum privati hominis nomen ſupra (immò & juxta) principes extolli. Tac.*

It ſeemeth alſo perilous that great Authority given to private men ſhould be long; for thereby oftentimes they are made inſolent and apt to innovation: *Libertatis ſive principatus magna imperia diuturna ſſe nu ſinas. Liv.*

Authority is alſo reinforced and enlarged by power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: *Parum tuta ſine viribus majeſtas. Liv.*

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## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Power and Force; and how to be raiſed and maintained.*

Power and Stength is attained by theſe five ways, Mony, Armes, Counſell, Friends and Fortune; but of theſe the firſt and moſt forcible is mony: *Nihil tam munitum quod non expugnari pecuniâ poſſit. Cic.*

Next to mony armes are of moſt uſe, as well to defend as to offend; to keep, as

to

to conquer; for oftentimes occaſion is to be offered as well to take from others, as to hold what is our own: *Sua retinere privatæ eſt domus, de alienis certare Regia laus eſt. Tac.*

Alſo of great and neceſſary uſe is Counſell, to deviſe how Arms ought to be employed or enforced: *Arma concilio temperanda. Tac.*

Likewiſe Friends and Confederates do greatly increaſe the vertue of power, the ſame being ſuch as have both wit and ability to aid: *In caducum parietem ne inclina: Adri.*

The laſt, yet not the leaſt part of power, conſiſteth in Fortune; whereof daily experience may be ſeen; for the ſucceſs of all humane actions ſeem rather to proceed from fortune then vertue. *Omni ratione potentior fortuna. Curt.*

To theſe particularities concerning power, we may add the qualities of the Prince, which greatly grace his authority; theſe are partly internal, and partly external; by the one I mean the vertues of the mind, by the other a certain ſeemly behavior and comly geſture of the body; of the firſt kind I do ſuppoſe piety and providence to be the chief, for piety maketh a Princk venerable, and like unto God; *Oportet*

*portet principem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia. Arist.*

Providence is a forecast and likely conjecture of things to come, supposed to be in those Princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly; it seemeth also a course of Princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many: *Autoritatem absentiâ tueare. Suet.*

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of Conspiracy and Treason; with the Causes and ways of prevention or discovery.*

CONspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes person; Treasons are addressed against his Government, Authority, Country, Subjects, or places of strength. These Mischiefs are easily feared, but hardly eschewed; for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred, yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret foes, and consequently not to be avoided: *Occulta pericula neque prævidere neque vitare in promptu est. Salust.*

The danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and corrnption

ruption in Soldiers, therefore with great difficulty to be avoided: *Vitæ tuæ dominus est, quisquis ſuam contempſit. Sen.*

Notwithſtanding it ſeemeth that either by Inquiſition, Puniſhment, Innocency, or Deſtiny, the evill affection of men may be oftentimes diſcovered: 1. For whoſo will curiouſly inquire and conſider the actions and ordinary ſpeeches of men (I mean thoſe that be perſons of honor and reputation) may oftentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the minds. *Quoniam raro niſi male loquenti male faciunt. Lipſ.*

2. Puniſhment is likewiſe a thing ſo terrible that the conſideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often diſcover thoſe dangerous intentions: *Cruciatu aut præmio cuncta pervia ſunt. Tac.*

But as it is wiſdom in Princes to give ear to informers, ſo are they not always to be believed; for Hope, Envy, Hate, or ſome other paſſion oftentimes draws them to ſpeak untruly. *Quis innocens eſſe poteſt ſi accuſare ſufficit? Tac.*

3. The third and likelieſt defence againſt conſpiracy is the Princes own Innocency; for never having injured any man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject ſo lewde as will endeavor to hurt him.

him. *Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia. Plin.*

4. The last and best bulwark to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny; which preceeding from the Fountain of divine providence, may be truly called the will of God; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes. *Ille erit à latere tuo, & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris. Salo.*

Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons, who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity, do not fear to enter into any impious action: To this humor ambitious men, dissentious, and all such as be desirous of Innovation, are inclined: *Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes. Hom.*

To these Offenders no punishment as equal to their impious merit, can be devised, being persons odious as well to friend as foes: *Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt, inviſi sunt. Tac.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of publick Hate and Contempt, with the occaſions and means to redreſs and avoid it.*

HAving briefly touched the Vertues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor, let ſomething be ſaid of the cauſes from whence their ruine doth proceed; the cheif whereof ſeemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Feare, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous. *Nulla vis imperii tanta eſt, quæ premente metu poſſit eſſe diuturna. Cic.*

The cauſes of Feare are Puniſhments, Impoſitions and Rigor; and therefore it behooveth a Prince not only to ſhun them, but to eſchew thoſe actions whereby he may reaſonably incur their ſuſpition. *Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint, non minus opinione & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri. Cic.*

Yet Puniſhment, Impoſition, and Cenſure are in all States neceſſary, although they ſhew and ſeem terrible, and conſequently breed a certain deſperation in Subiects, unleſs they be diſcreetly and modeſtly uſed; for

for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty; great and many Imposts savour of Covetousness; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences, doth seem Rigor in these matters; therefore it behooveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous, chiefly in Capital Punishment, which must be confined within the bounds of Justice. *Sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis. Sen.*

But if for securitie sake the Prince be forced to punish, let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness: *Tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat. Sen.*

Let all punishments also be slowly executed; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned; neither ought any Capitall Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for example sake. *Non tam ut ipsi pereant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant. Sen.*

In punishing also a special respect must be had, that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein. *Forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere. Sen.*

Also in punishing equality must be observed, and the nature of the punishment according to the Custom. *Nec eisdem de causis*

*alii*

*alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. Cic.*

But in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part, the execution ought to be otherwise, and as it were at an instant, which may haply seem terrible, but in effect is not. *Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit, omnium irritat. Sen.*

Another meanes to satisfie a people offended is to punish the Ministers of cruelty, and with their blood to wash away the common hatred. *Piaculares publici odii victimæ. Plin.* By this King *David* did appease the *Gibeonites.*

The next cause of discontent cometh of Impositions, under which word is comprehended all levies of mony, a matter nothing pleasing to people, as that which they esteem equall to their own lives. *Pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus. Plaut.*

First, to remove hate conceived of this cause, there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? *Nulla quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt, Tac.*

The second remedy against Hate for impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as *Tiberius* the Emperor was wont

to ſay, a Sheep ſhould be fleeced not flead. *Qui nimis emungit, elicit ſanguinem. Tac.*

Thirdly, alſo to eſchew the offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant eye on Informers, Promoters, and ſuch fiſcal Miniſters, whoſe cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occaſion great hate; but this miſchief may be, though hardly, encountred, either by chooſing honeſt Officers, or (proving otherwiſe) not only to reſtraine them but to uſe them as ſpunges, *Exprimendi poſtquam biberint. Suet.*

In all impoſitions or Taxations, no cruelty or force ought to be uſed, the ſecond cauſe to kindle hate: and to meet with that miſchief, nothing is better then to proceed moderately, and without extremity. *Ne Boves ipſoi, mox agros, poſtremò corpora ſervitio aut pœnæ tradant. Tac.*

The fourth remedy is the Princes own parſimony, not giving ſo largely to private perſons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude. *Magnæ opes non tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, quæruntur. Mæcenas:*

The laſt help againſt hate is in taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without favor or reſpect; and that the Aſſeſſors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner ſort of people. *Populus maximam fidem rerum ſuarum habet. Tac.*

Touching

Touching Cenſure, which we numbred amongſt the cauſes whereof hate is conceived, much needeth not to be ſpoken, becauſe the ſame is diſcontinued, or rather utterly forgotten; yet doth it ſeem a thing neceſſary, being a certain obſervation and controlement of ſuch evill manners, and diſorders as were not by Law Corrigible; theſe Officers were of the *Romans* called *Magiſtri pudoris & modeſtiæ. Livi.*

To the Function of Cenſures theſe two things are anciently ſubject Manners, and Exceſs; Under Manners I comprehend Wantonneſs, Drunkenneſs, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all ſuch Lewdneſs as Modeſty condemneth. Theſe diſorders were anciently puniſhed by the diſcretion of Cenſors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleneſs might be generally avoided. *Vniverſa plebs habeat negotia ſua, quibus à malo publico detineatur. Saluſt.*

Exceſs includeth Riotouſneſs, expence of Money, Prodigal houſekeeping, Banqueting, and Superfluitie in Apparrel, which things are the mothers of many miſcheifs. It alſo ſeemeth in ſome ſort perillous to the Prince that the Subject ſhould exceed either in Covetize or Conſuming. *Nemo nimis excedat, ſive amicorum copiâ, ſive opum. Ariſt.*

The puniſhment inflicted upon theſe ſorts

of offenders, were either Ignominy, or Pecuniarie punishments, *Censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem. Tac.*

The first and chiefest meanes to remove these inconveniences, is the Princes own example, whose life being well censured, easily reduceth others to order. *Vita principis censura perpetua. Plin.*

Secondly, Those disorders may be taken away without danger, if the Censures doe proceed by degrees and leasurely; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered. *Vitia quædam tollit facilius princeps, si eorum sit patiens. Sen.*

These are the cheifest rules whereby to eschew hate; but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it; for being himself good, he incurreth the offence of all bad folk: if he be evil, good men will hate him; this danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded: becaus hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing. *Odia qui nimium timet, regnare nescit. Sen.*

One other means to remove this error, is, to reward the good and well deserving Subjects; for no man can think him cruell that for love to Vertue useth Austeritie: which wil appear when he bestoweth bountifully on the good. *Præmio & pœna Respublica continetur. Solon.* The

The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain baſe and vile conceipt, which entereth into the Subjects, ſtrangers or ſervants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be reſembled to the powers of mans mind, whereunto the hands, the feet, the eyes, do by conſent obey. *Vires imperii in conſenſu obedientium ſunt Livi.*

The cauſes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of Government, Fortune, or the Princes manners; the form of Government becometh contemptible, when the Prince deſiring to be thought merciful, ruleth rather pittifully then juſtly: which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people, and in liew thereof entereth liberty, or at leaſt a certain boldneſs to offend; *Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet viſum, non poteſt comprimere ingenitam ſingulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.*

Alſo to be Mutable, Irreſolute, light and Inconſiderate in beſtowing the Honors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince contemptible; *Qui præſentibus fruitur, nec in longius conſultat. Ariſt.*

But if contempt be cauſed by Fortune, or as may be ſaid more reaſonably, by deſtiny, and that thoſe friends do fail who ought in

duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there ſmall hope to eſchew contempt. *Fato obnoxia virtus. Plaut.*

The Princes manners do breed contempt, when he yeildeth his affections to ſenſuality and ſloth, or if he incur the ſuſpition of Simplicity, Cowardiſe, or any ſuch Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth; Common people do ſometimes alſo diſeſteem the Prince for external and light cauſes, as deformity of perſon, ſickneſs or ſuch like. *Mos vulgi eſt, fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere. Tac.*

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Diffidence and Diſſimulation in the mannage of State Affairs.*

ALbeit roundneſs and plain dealing be moſt worthy praiſe, chiefly in private perſons; yet becauſe all men in their actions do not ſo proceed, it behooveth Wiſe Men and Princes above others at occaſions to ſemble and diſſemble; for as in all actions a Prince ought to be ſlow and adviſed; ſo in conſent and beleiving haſte and facility is moſt dangerous; and though credulity be rather an error then a fault;

yet

yet for Princes it is both unfit and perilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution, *Nihil credendo, atque omnia cauendo. Cic.*

Notwithſtanding he muſt not ſhew himſelf diffident or diſtruſtful utterly; but as I wiſh he ſhould not over-ſlightly believe all men, ſo ought he not for ſmall cauſes diſtruſt every man. *Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli. Sen.*

Diſſimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence, a quality in Princes of ſo great neceſſity as moved the Emperor *Tiberius* to ſay, *Neſcit regnare, qui neſcit diſſimulare.*

The neceſſity of diſſimulation is chiefly to be uſed with ſtrangers and enemies: it alſo ſheweth a certain diſcretion in Magiſtrates ſometimes to diſguiſe with friends when no offence doth thereof follow. *Doli non ſunt dolo, niſi aſtu colas. Plaut.*

This kind of craft albeit in every mans conceipt not praiſable, is nevertheleſs tolerable, and for Princes and Magiſtrates (the ſame being uſed to good ends) very neceſſary. But thoſe cunnings which are contrary to vertue, ought not of honeſt men to be uſed: neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption; though they be often uſed in Court and are of ſome learned writers

allowed. *Decipere pro moribus temperare, prudentia eſt. Plin.*

By great ſubtiltie and frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety, I mean Perjury and Injuſtice, which though all men in words deteſt, yet in deeds are uſed of many, perſwading themſelves by Cavillations and Sophiſtications to excuſe the impiety of their falſe Oathes: as it is written of *Lyſander, Pueros talis, viros juramentis circumvenire ſolebat. Plut.*

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Warr Defenſive and Invaſive: with Inſtructions touching Laws of Armes, Soldiers, and Military Diſcipline.*

THe Art Military is of all other qualities moſt neceſſary for Princes; for without it they cannot be defended; force of men only ſufficeth not, unleſs the ſame be governed by Council, and Martial Wiſdom. *Duo ſunt quibus reſp. ſervatur; in hoſtes fortitudo, & domi concordia. Tac.*

Military knowledge concerneth Warr, and every Warr is either Forreign or Domeſtical. Touching Forriegn it muſt be conſidered

ſidered when it muſt be begun, how to continue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is, to take heed that the cauſe be juſt, and the enterpriſe adviſedly entred into. *Sunt enim & belli ſicut pacis jura, juſteque ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes. Liv.*

The Laws of Arms are in all Commonweales to be duly obſerved: for to enter fight raſhly and without reſpect to reaſon, were beaſtly; alſo to kill or ſlay would work no better effect, then that all Nations ſhould without mercy murder one another; *Barbaro ritu cœdem cœde, & ſanguinem ſangnine expiare. Sal.*

No Warr therefore is to be made but ſuch as is juſt. And in every juſt War theſe three things are to be looked into (*viz.*) that the Author be of Authority, that the cauſe be good, and the end juſt; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the Soveraignty reſteth, are the juſt Authors of Warr: others have no ſuch Authority. *Si quis privatim ſine publico ſcito, pacem bellumve fecerit, capitale eſto. Plato.*

Warrs are of two ſorts: Defenſive and Offenſive. the one to reſiſt, the other to invade; againſt defence nothing can be ſaid, becauſe it is natural and neceſſary. *Eſt non modo juſtum ſed etiam neceſſarium cum vi vis illata defenditur. Cic.* Defenſive

Defensive Warr is of two sorts, either to defend thine own, or thy friends; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth: and therewith also by Arms to defend the liberty of Country, Parents, and Friends. *Nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. Cic.*

The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends: for the common obligation of humane society doth so require. *Quo enim non obstitit si potest, injuria, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes aut patriam, aut socios deserat. Cic.*

Invasion is also just and allowable, but not ever; for who so hath bin robbed, or spoiled of his Lands, or Goods, may lawfully seek repossession by force: yet so, as before any force be used, he first civilly seek restitution, wherein if Justice be denied, then is the use of Arms necessary: *Justum bellum quibus necessarium; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes. Liv.*

Likewise invasion is lawfull against Barbarians, whose Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred, chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend; for the cause of such Warr is compulsion and suppression of evil. *Cujusvis iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur, August.*

Finally,

Finally, To conclude this matter of invasion, I say, That no revenge, no desire of honor or Empire, are any lawful causes of War; but the intent thereof ought to be directed onely to defence and security: For wise men do take arms to win Peace, and in hope of rest they endure travel. *Ita bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pacem quæsita videatur. Cic.*

Having said somewhat against unjust War, let us speak of temerity and unadvised War, an enterprise worthy discommendation. *Omnes bellum sumunt facile, gerrimè desinunt: nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est. Sal.*

A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion, nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any War, as he that is unwilling to offend, yet of courage enough to defend. *Nec provoces bellum, nec timeas. Plin.*

To make War, three things are required. Money, Men, and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council are needful: Therefore a wise Prince before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what forces, and charge thereunto belongeth. *Diu apparandum est bellum; ut vincas melius. Pub.*

Above all other Provisions, care must be had,

had, that Bread be not wanting; for without it, neither victory nor life can be looked for. *Qui frumentum neceſſariumque commeatum non præparat, vincitur ſine ferro. Vegetius.*

Laſtly, it behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readineſs, I mean, Harneſs, Horſes, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder, and every other thing neceſſary either for ſervice on Horſe or Foot: We may adde hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all ſorts, with every furniture of offence or defence; for theſe preparations make a Prince formidable, becauſe no man dare do or attempt injury to that King or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge. *Qui deſiderat pacem, præparat bellum. Caſſ.*

By men we mean a multitude of Subjects armed, trained to defend or offend: Theſe are of two ſorts, Captains and Soldiers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horſemen; the one of great uſe in the Champion, the other in Mountainous places; alſo for defence or aſſault of Towns or Grounds fortified moſt neceſſary, and conſequently meet for ſervice in all places, which moved *Tacitus* to ſay, *Omne in pedite robur, Tac.*

For ſudden ſervice, Horſes do ſeem moſt meet,

meet, and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed: Nevertheless the actions of Footmen do seem more certainly executed, cheifly if they be well armed, and skilfully led; for so experience hath of late time proved; besides, that they are of less expence and of greater number. *In universum æstimanti plus in pedite robur: Tac.*

Having thus proved, that both Horse and Foot be necessary; let us remember, that unless they be serviceable, great numbers are to small purpose. *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus, Livi.*

To make Soldiers serviceable, consisteth in good choice and good Discipline; the one at this day little regarded. *Emunt militem, non legunt, Livi.*

Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of Bodies; and every Company composed of men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more confident: But hereof is small heed taken; for commonly they are *Purgamenta urbium suarum, Curt.*

Touching Discipline, it seemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Substance, is observed: For as in former ages, Soldiers endeavored to be vertuous and modest, so now they rather study

to

to excel in Riot, then in Martial knowledge. *Exercitus lingua quam manu promptior, prædator est sociis, & ipse præda hostium. Sal.*

For as much as Soldiers are made good by election and choice, it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make Election; yet will we adde, that they must be chosen of natural Subjects; for strangers are covetous, and consequently corruptible; they are also mutinous and cowardly: Their custom likewise is to rob, burn, and spoyl both friends and foes, and to consume the Princes treasure. *Ossa vides regum vacuis exsucta medullis. Juven.*

But the Native Soldier is faithful and obedient, resolute in fight, loving to his Countrey, and loyal to his Prince. *Gentes quæ sub regibus sunt, pro Deo colunt. Curt.*

Native Soldiers are of two sorts, (*viz.*) They that be in continual pay, and they that are trained ready to serve, but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs, until they be called: The first are for all Princes necessary. *In pace decus, in bello præsidium. Tac.*

Of this sort no great number ought to be, as well to eschew disorder, as also to save

ſave expences. The ſecond kinde of foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as people more patient of pains, and fit for the Wars; yet ſo judiciouſly diſpoſed as the Citizens. *Odio præſentium & non cupidine mutationis. Tac.*

Touching the number of theſe extraordinary Soldiers, that muſt be referred to diſcretion: *Bellum parare, ſimul & æraria parcere.*

To conclude, I ſay theſe numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people, not inſerting any Gentlemen; for ſervice on horſ-back is to them onely proper. *Alas ruſticis non tribue; in nobilitatem & in divites hæc à pauperibus onera inclines. Livi.*

The moſt certain notes whereby to conceive the diſpoſition of men fit to become Soldiers, are theſe five. The Country where they are born, their age, proportion of body, their quality of minde, and their faculty. Touching

Firſt, The Countrey, it is a thing apparently proved, that Mountainous Regions, or barren places, and Northern habitations do breed wits well diſpoſed to the War. *Locorum aſperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat. Curt.*

Secondly, The Age moſt apt for the War,

was

was anciently obſerved to be about eighteen years, and ſo the *Romans* uſed. *Facilius eſt ad virtutem inſtruere novos milites, quàm revocare præteritos. Veget.*

Thirdly, The ſtature of a Soldier ought to be obſerved: *Marius* liked beſt the longeſt Bodies; *Pyrrhus* preferred large and well proportioned men; but *Vegetius* in his choice, rather eſteems ſtrength then ſtature: *Utilius eſt fortes milites eſſe quàm grandes. Veget.*

Fourthly, The Minde or Spirit of a Soldier ought to be conſidered; for that Minde which is quick, nimble, bold, and confident, ſeemeth apt for War: He is alſo of good hope, that loveth honor more then eaſe or profit: In brief, *Is qui nihil metuit niſi turpem famam. Sal.*

Laſtly, it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred; for it may be preſumed that Fiſhers, Fowlers, Cooks, and others trained up in effeminate arts are unfit for Martial endeavor: And as theſe men were in reſpect of their trade thought unmeet ſo in old time, ſlaves and maſterleſs men were repulſed from arms, as perſons infamous. *Sed nunc tales ſociantur armis quales Domini habere faſtidiunt. Veget.*

How Soldiers ought to be choſen, theſe few words we have ſpoken, may ſuffice. Let

us therefore ſay ſomewhat of Diſcipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Diſcipline doth make and continue them fit for ſervice. *Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, bona inſtitutione plures reddat induſtria: Veget.*

Diſcipline is a certain ſevere confirmation of Soldiers in their Valor and Vertue, and is performed by four means, Exerciſe, Order, Compulſion, and Example. The two firſt appertain to Valor, the third to Vertue, the laſt to both: But of Exerciſe, firſt, I ſay, That a Soldier being choſen, ought to be informed in Arms, and uſed in Exerciſe and Action; the word *exercitium* importeth nothing elſe. *Exercitus dicitur, quod melius fit exercitando. Varro.* *Diſcipline.*

Order conſiſteth in dividing, diſpoſing, and placing of men aptly at all occaſions to be commanded, as the Leaders ſhall direct: This matter requireth a large diſcourſe, and therefore I refer it to skilful Captains and Writers, as *Polybius, Vegetius, De la Nonne*, and others.

Compulſion and Correction, is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of Soldiers: For no order can be obſerved amongſt them, unleſs they be continent, modeſt, and abſtinent; for continency is cheifly to be ſhewed in their diet, and mode-

rate desires. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum. Tac:*

The Modesty of a Soldier is perceived by his Words, Apparel, and Actions: For to be a vaunter, or vain-glorious boaster, is far unfit in him that professeth Honor or Arms, seeing true Vertue is silent. *Viri militiæ nati, factis magni, ad verborum linguæque certamina, rudes. Tac.*

The Apparel of a Soldier sheweth modesty, if therein he do not exceed; for albeit it fitteth well the Profession of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity. *Horridum militem esse decet, non calatum auro argentoque sed ferro. Livi.*

Abstinence is also fit for all Soldiers; for thereby guided, they refrain from violence, and insolency; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the Country where they serve, and likewise in their Lodgings: Never taking any thing from the owner, nor committing any outrage. *Vivant cum provincialibus jure civili, nec insolescat animus qui se sensit armatum.*

The last mark of Discipline we called Example, under which word is Comprehended reward and punishment: For men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular Service, Honor or Riches.

Riches. And for Evil, they have their due when they taſte the puniſhment thereunto belonging. *Neceſſarium eſt acrius ille dimicet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiæ & imperatoris judicium conſuevit evehere. Veget.*

Likewiſe as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deſerving Soldiers; ſo puniſhment is due to thoſe that be vitious and cowardly; for nothing holdeth Soldiers in obedience ſo much as the ſeverity of diſcipline. *Milites imperatorem potius quam hoſtem metuere debent. Veg.*

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## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Generals and Commanders, and their requiſite Abilities in Martial enterpriſes and expeditions.*

OF Soldiers let this little ſuffice; we will now ſpeak of what quality Cheiftants and leaders ought to be, for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole Armies. *Militaris turba ſine duce, corpus ſine ſpiritu. Curtc.*

A Cheif or General in Warr, is either of his own Authority cheif, or a general that commandeth in the name of another. Of the

first sort are Emperors, Kings, and Princes; of the other, be their Deputies, Lievtenants, Collonels, and indeed all generall Commanders in the War: Now whether it be more expedient that the Prince should command in person or by deputy, divers wise men have diversly thought, therefore it may be be thus distinguished; if the War do then only concern some particular part or Province, then may the same be performed by a Lievtenant; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise. *Dubiis bellorum eximiis summa rerum & imperii seipsum reservat. Tac.*

It therefore importeth the Prince sometimes by his own presence, sometimes by his deputation to performe that Office: but however occasion shall require, it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be; (for plurality of Cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect) yet with this caution that he be of experience, and wise. *In bellica praefectura major aspectus habendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum. Arist.*

The qualities required in a Cheiftaine are these, Skill, Vertue, Providence, Authority, and Fortune By skill we meane he should be of great knowledge, and long experience

perience or to make a ſufficient Captaine; the information of others, or his own reading is not enough. *Qui norit quis ordo agminis, quæ cura exploa ndi, quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus. Cic.*

Military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exerciſe Soldiers aſwell in fained war as to fight with the Enemy; and ſummarily a Captain ought to be *Laborioſus in negotio, fortis in periculo, induſtrius in agendo, celeris in conficiendo. Cic.*

Next to vertue we placed providence as neceſſary in great Captains; for being of ſuch wiſdome they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then neceſſity ſhal inforce; yet true it is, fools and vulger folks that commend or diſcommend actions according to ſucceeſs, were wont to ſay: *Cunctatio ſervilis; ſtatim exequi, Regium eſt.* But adviſed and provident Captains do think; *Temeritas præterquam quod ſtulta, eſt etiam infelix. Livi.*

Albeit providence be the beſt mean of good ſpeed; yet ſome Captains of that quality and in skill excelling, have bin in their actions unlucky; when others of leſs ſufficiency have marvellouſly prevailed; we may therefore reaſonably ſay with, *Cic.* *Quod olim Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario & ceteris magnis*

*nis Imperatoribus non ſolum propter virtutem, ſed etiam propter fortunam ſæpiſſime imperia mandata, atq; exercitus eſſe commiſſos. Cic.*

Laſtly, we wiſhed authority to be in Cheiftains; for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the Enemy hath of ſuch a Governor, and likewiſe how much his friends and confederates do eſteem him: but the cheif and only means to maintain Authority, is Auſterity and Terror. *Dux Authoritatem maximam ſeveritate ſumat, omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet, nulli errantium creditur ignoſcere. Veget.*

Alſo experience hath proved that ſuch Cheiftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they incur a contempt: but on the otherſide thoſe that commanded ſeverely and terribly, although they gained no good will, yet were they ever obeyed: *Dux facilis inutilis. App.*

CHAP.

# CHAP. XXIII.

## *Of Councils in War, and directions Tactik and Stratagematik: with advice how to make an honorable Peace.*

AFter men found and framed fit for the Warr, to ſmall or no purpoſe ſhall they ſerve, unleſs they be imployed by wiſdom or good Council. *Non minus eſt Imperatoris conſilio quam vi perficere. Tac.*

Council in War is of two ſorts; direct Council and indirect; the firſt ſheweth a plain and orderly courſe for proceeding, as to lay hold on occaſion: for as in all other human actions occaſion is of great force; *Occaſio in bello ſolet amplius juvare quam virtus. Veget.*

As occaſions preſented are means of good ſucceſs; ſo fame worketh great effects in the Wars; therefore it behooveth a Captain to be conſtant, and not apt to beleive the vain rumors and reports of men. *Male imperatur, cum regit vulgus duces ſuos. Sen.*

Confidence is alſo to be eſchewed; for no man is ſooner ſurpriſed, then he who feareth leſt: alſo contempt of the Enemy

hath bin occasion of great discomfitures, therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, so should he not contemn his Enemy. *Nimia fiducia semper obnoxia. Æmyl.*

As security, and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull: so doth it import every good Captain to be well informed not only of his own forces, but also of what strength the Enemy is; likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the Country and the quality of the people, with every other circumstance. Moreover, the Generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the Enemy. *Impetus acres cunctatione languescunt, aut in perfidiam mutantur. Tac.*

Temerity in War is also dangerous; for wise Captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity, unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced. *In rebus asperis & tenuis spe, fortissima quaq; consilia tutissima sunt. Livi.*

Some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from Heaven or on Earth are not to be neglected, neither are dreams in time of War to be contemned. *Nam amat benignitas numinis, seu quod merentur homines, seu quod tangi-*

tur

*ſur eorum affectione, his quoque rationibus prodere quæ impendent. Æmi.*

A wiſe Captain will alſo wait oportunities and ſpy out fit times when the Enemy is wearied, or pretending fear, draw him into danger; which advantages with many other, are gained chiefly by obſerving of time; *Quia ſi in occaſionis momento, cujus prætervolat oportunitas, cunctatus paulum fueris, nequicquam mox omiſſam quæraris. Livi.*

Next the obſervation of Time, the Place is to be well conſidered, whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies. *Amplius prodeſt locus ſæpè quàm virtus. Veget.*

Thirdly, It importeth much, that men be well ordered, trained, and prepared for the fight; for the want of Art is cauſe of many diſadventures, and many times a ſmall ſupply of choice Soldiers on horsback or foot, doth ſeem to the enemy very terrible: Likewiſe a ſudden ſhout or conceit hath amazed a whole Army. *Milites vanis & inanibus, magis quam juſtis formidinis cauſis moventur. Curt.*

Fourthly, It were to good purpoſe, that in ordering of men for fight, Soldiers of one Country or Nations, ſhould be ranged together, and above all to foreſee, that the leaſt loſs of Blood be among the Natural Subjects,

Subjects, and so handle the Matter, that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and Mercenaries. *Ingens victoria decus, citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti. Tac.*

The Generals own courage and lively disposition to fight, will greatly animate the multitude of Soldiers; as a contrary countenance or appearance of Fear, will exceedingly maze and dant. *Necesse est ad fugam parati sint, qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare. Veget.*

It were also for thy great advantage, that the forces should be ordered for the fight, before the enemy be prepared.

First, For that thou maist the better perform, what thou thinkest fit to be done.

Secondly, That thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage, being readiest to assail the enemy, and to begin the fight. *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti. Livi.*

After Victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty, but proceed moderately; for it shall suffice the Victory is thine. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia, & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido. Veget.*

Lastly, I would advise that the General should be wary in his Actions, and in every enterprise to frustrate the Soldiers from spoils and pillage. *Sæpe obstitit vincentibus pravum*

*gravum inter ipſos certamen, omiſſo hoſte ſpolia conſectandi. Tac.*

Of direct Councils, let that we have ſaid ſuffice. We will now ſpeak of Councils indirect, commonly called by the Greek word, *Stratagemi* or *Subtile practices*: Which manner of proceeding, hath been in times paſt of divers grave Writers condemned. *Vir nemo mentis altæ clanculum velit occidere hoſtem. Eurip.*

Notwithſtanding the opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy credit, it ſeemeth reaſonable, and in piety allowable: that Stratagems and Subtilties may be uſed in the War, yet with ſuch Caution as the ſame may ſtand with Fidelity and Honor: For Fraud being uſed contrary to Contracts and Agreements made with the enemy, is meer Treachery: As to poyſon him or her, a murtherer to kill him, were plain Impiety. *Fœderatum injuſtè fallere impium. Livi.*

Alſo out of the War covertly to kill a particular enemy by ſecret Aſſault or Practice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honor; yet to uſe all craft, cunning, and ſubtilty in open War, is both allowable and praiſable; and ſo is thought by Chriſtian Writers. *Cum juſtum bellum ſuſcipitur, ut apertè pugnet quis aut ex inſidiis, nihil ad juſtitiam intereſt. Aug.*

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The ſame is alſo approved by divers Authors of good credit. *Confice ſive dolo ſeu ſtricto cominus enſe.* The ſame is alſo affirmed by *Xenophon*, *Reipſa nihil utilius in bello dolis.*

Thus having briefly touched what Counſels are required in War, let us conſider how Victory is to be uſed; for the end of every good War is Peace: To the enjoying whereof, three things are required, Warineſs, Mercy, and Modeſty; becauſe overgreat confidence may happily impeach the end of good Succeſs. *Res ſecundæ negligentiam creant. Livi.*

I alſo wiſh the Victory to be handled mercifully, becauſe all Conqueſts are in their own nature cruel enough. And the Ire of inſolent Soldiers, forces the conquered to become deſperate. *Graviſsime morſus irritatæ neceſsitatis. Curt.*

To proceed Modeſtly, is alſo an honorable quality in him that conquereth: For in proſperous Fortunes, men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings; yea, ſome good and great Captains have in like caſes forgotten what did beſt become them. *In rebus ſecundis etiam egregii Duces inſoleſcunt. Tac.*

After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Govern-

ment

ment could ſtand: Therefore how great, or how long ſoever the War be, the end muſt be Peace; the name whereof is not onely ſweet, but alſo comfortable, *Pax una triumphis innumeris potior.*

Peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious, but alſo to thoſe that are victored. *Pacem reduci velle victori, expedit, victo neceſſe eſt. Tac.*

Nevertheleſs until good and honorable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid aſide: Wherein I wiſh *Tullies* advice to be followed. *Bellum gerendum eſt; ſi bellum omittemus, pace nunquam fruemur. Livi.*

In Treaty of Peace, two things muſt be conſidered: Firſt, That the conditions be honorable. To condiſcend to any baſe conditions, is unto a Princely minde not onely great indignity, but alſo intolerable. *Cum dignitate potius cadendum, quam cum ignominia ſerviendum Plut.*

It alſo importeth, the Peace ſhould be ſimple, true, and unfeigned; for all feigned and diſſembling Amity is to be doubted. *Pace ſuſpecta tutius eſt bellum. Mithrid.*

The fitteſt ſeaſon to ſpeak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or during the time that the enemies be of equal force; for if the war continueth, it muſt behove the weaker to yield to neceſſity: Not unlike

like the Shipmaſter, who to ſave himſelf doth caſt the greateſt part of his loading into the Sea: *Neceſſitati pare, quam ne dii quidem ſuperant. Livi.*

Finally, Having generouſly defended thy ſelf, and performed all things required in a magnanimous Captain, and finding nevertheleſs thy force inſufficient, it cannot be diſhonorable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aſide Hatred and Hope, which are but weak ſupporters, thou maiſt recommend thee and thine to the approved diſcretion of an honorable enemy. *Victores ſecundæ res in miſerationem ex ira vertunt. Livi.*

Now for as much as every Peace promiſeth reſt and quiet, as well to the victorious as to the victored; we may adde thereunto, that the Prince victorious receiveth thereby Honor, Profit, and Security. For although his happineſs may occaſion Hope of greater ſucceſs; yet in reſpect of Fortunes mutability, it ſhall be good and glorious to liſten to peace. *Decorum principi eſt cum victoriam propè in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere, ut ſciant omnes te & ſuſcipere juſtè bellum, & finire. Livi.*

It ſeemeth alſo the more Honorable; for who ſo is victorious, doth give Peace and not take it: He alſo ſheweth himſelf diſcreet by uſing a moderation in Victory; and

and no extremity in ſpoiling, which our wiſe and godly Writers have commended: *Pacem contemnentes, & gloriam appetentes, pacem perdunt & gloriam. Bern.*

Peace is alſo profitable for the victorious, becauſe continual War breedeth wearineſs, and of violent proceeding deſperation and peril cometh. *Maximi & mortiferi morſus eſſe ſolent morientium beſtiarum. Sen.*

Likewiſe Peace is more aſſured then any victory. Hope of the one is in thine own power; the other in the hand of God: Adde thereunto the force of Fortune, which hath great power in all humane actions. *In rebus ſecundis nihil in quenquam ſuperbè ac violenter conſulere decet, nec præſenti credere Fortunæ, cum quid viſper ferat, incertus ſis. Sen.*

Alſo conditions of Peace ought to be reaſonable and freely beſtowed: For no people can live contented under ſuch a Law as forceth them to loath the State wherein they are. *Miſera pax bello benè mutatur. Sen.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIIII.

### *Of Civil War, with the cauſes and Remedies thereof.*

THE greateſt and moſt greivous calamity that can come to any State is Civil War; for therein Subjects take arms againſt their Prince or among themſelves, whereof followeth a miſery more lamentable then can be deſcribed. *Non ætas, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus ſtupra cadibus, & cædes ſtuprus miſceantur. Tac.*

The firſt cauſe of Civil War proceedeth of deſtiny for God in his own divine providence foreſeeth many years before, that great and mighty Empires ſhall be ruined.

*In ſe magna ruunt: lætis hinc numina rebus*
*Creſcendi poſuere modum —— Lucan.*

The ſecond cauſe is, exceſſe, riot, and diſſolute life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury ſo ſoon as over great happineſs; alſo pompous Apparell, banqueting and prodigall ſpending conſumeth riches, and plenty is turned into poverty; for by theſe means are men brought into deſperation. *Rapacissimo cuique ac perditissimo, non agri aut*

*fœnus*

*fanus ſed ſola inſtrumenta vitiorum manebunt. Tac.*

Now to conſider how deſtiny might be eſchewed, were in vain: For ſuch a remedy no wit or wiſdom can deviſe, being the decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. *Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem ſemper loco ſtare fortunam. Sen.*

There is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation; the earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto ſubject. *Certa ſunt cuncta temporibus; naſci debent, creſcere, extingui. Sen.*

Touching the ſecond cauſes of Civil War ſome remedies may be uſed, becauſe it preceedeth of Faction, Sedition or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain aſſociation of divers perſons combined to the offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick diſpleaſure, and more often of ambition. *Nemo eorum qui in Rep. verſantur, quos vincat, ſed à quibus vincatur, aſpicit. Sen.*

1. Factions are of two ſorts; for either they conſiſt of many or of few perſons: both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take arms; and that party which proveth weakeſt, prayeth arms of forrain forces.

2. The other faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great perſonages

or men of more importance than ordinary people; and that proveth moſt perillous and bloody. *Nobilium factiones trahunt ad ſe, & in partes, univerſum etiam populum. Ariſt.*

Albeit ſome wiſe men have held opinion that factions are neceſſary, yet cannot that conceipt be reaſonably maintained, unleſs it be upon confines and in ſuch places where conſpiracy is feared, which *Cato* in his private Family uſed. *Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut diſſenſum inter ſervos callidè ſerebat, ſuſpectam habens nimiam concordiam eorum, mutuenſque. Plut.*

Factions amongſt the Nobility, are ſometimes ſuppreſſed by forbidding colors, or unknown badges to be worn; alſo to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is neceſſary, which was *Mecænas* counſel to *Auguſtus*; and *Ariſtotle* thinketh it fit that Laws ſhould be made againſt the Factions of Nobſemen. *Nobilium contentiones & partis etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari. Ariſt.*

Another cauſe of civil war, we call ſedition, which is a ſuddain commotion or aſſembly of common people againſt their Prince or his Magiſtrates: the Original of which diſorders may proceed of divers cauſes, but chiefly of oppreſſion. *Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipſa pericula arbitrari. Ariſt.*

Again,

Again, Fear may be the occaſion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is deſirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed alſo of over-great mildneſs in Government. *Non miſeriis ſed licentia, tantum concitum turbarum, laſcivire magis plebem quàm ſævire. Livi.*

Sedition many times ariſeth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whoſe Arts are grown out of uſe, and conſequently no means whereof they can live. *Semper in civitate, quibus opes nullæ ſunt, bonis invident, vetera odêre, nova expetunt, odio rerum ſuarum mutari omnia ſtudent. Sab.*

Laſtly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Inſolency, or Mutinous diſpoſition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation, yet doth it ſtand firm, until ſome firſt mover taketh the matter in hand. *Multitudo omnis, ſicut mare, per ſe immobilis. Livi.*

Of theſe Movers ſome are Ambitious, who wanting other means to aſpire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compaſs their deſigns; or elſe they are Unthrifts, who having conſumed their own, ſeek by violence to poſſeſs themſelves of other mens: Or elſe they are vain and light perſons, that

without cauſe or reaſon, attempt innovation, themſelves know not for what. *Non tam præmiis periculorum, quàm ipſis periculis lati, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambigua, ancipitia malunt.*

Thus having told the cauſes of Sedition, I wiſh the remedies were prepared. *Omne malum naſcens facilè opprimitur, inveteratum ſit plerumque robuſtius. Cic.*

The firſt way to ſuppreſs Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent perſwaſion, which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude; cheifly when it proceedeth from ſome reverend and grave perſon, for his wiſdom and integrity of life honored: For the Prince himſelf is not to take this office in hand, unleſs neceſſity ſo inforce: *Integra auctoritas principis majoribus remediis ſervatur. Tac.*

If perſwaſion cannot prevail, then force muſt compel: But before ſuch violent proceedings, uſe art and cunning either to appeaſe the people, or at leaſt to diſunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and promiſe plauſibly: *Verba apud populum plurimum valent. Tac.*

It is lawful alſo in ſuch caſes for Princes to uſe ſubtilty; and the fame not prevailing, to waſh away the ſtain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms are laid down, and

every

every one yielded, general puniſhment were needleſs. *Omnium culpa fuit, pancorum ſit pœna. Tac.*

The laſt cauſe of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceeding the Laws of God and nature. The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth arms in defence of Peace, the other uſeth them to terrifie thoſe of whom his cruelty hath deſerved hate: *Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falſis nominibus imperium, atque ubi ſolitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant. Tac.*

The quality of Tyrants is to eſteem Promooters more then good Miniſters, becauſe thoſe men are the ſcourge of infinite others. They are alſo Protectors of impious perſons, and ſtand in daily doubt of Noble and Vertuous Men. *Nobilitas, opes, amiſſi geſtique honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium. Tac.*

Tyrants do alſo endeavor to ſuppreſs the knowledge of Letters and civil life, to the end all good arts ſhould be exiled, and Barbariſm introduced. *Pellunt ſapientiæ profeſſores, & omnes bonas artes in exilium agunt. Tac.*

Theſe and ſuch like, be the conditions of Tyrants, who for the moſt part are depoſed and ſlain; for as Kings live long and

deliver their Dominions to their Children, and Posterity; so Tyrants being feared and hated of all men, cannot continue in their estate.

*Ad generum Cereris sine cœde & vulnere pauci*
*Descendunt reges & sicca morte Tyranni. Juven.*

The Remedies of these Mischeifs which proceed from the violence of such a Prince, are Persecution or Patience. Many generous spirits have used the first; perswading themselves rather to die, then endure the sight of a Tyrant. Also the *Grecians* did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious Prince. *Graci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt. Cic.*

Nevertheless, in Christian consideration the other course is to be taken: Let patience therefore incounter this mischeif; for seeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be sent by God, they must be indured. *Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem. Homer.*

Persecution is not onely perilous, but for the most part Infortunate: For thereof present revenge is taken by that Prince that succeedeth. *Facinoris ejus ultor est, quisquis successerit. Tac.*

The murder of Tyrants is also followed with

with many inconveniences worse then civil War it self. *Principes boni, votis expetendi, quales cunque tolerandi. Tac.*

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are necessarily to be suffered: So evil Princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured, because their office is to command, and subjects must obey. *Indigna, digna habenda sunt, Rex qua facit. Sen.*

And as it is the use of vulgar people to finde faults in the long raign of Princes; so the ambition of great Subjects is desirous of novelty. *Præsens imperium subditis semper grave. Thucyd.*

To conclude, we say that the best remedy against Tyranny, is Patience: For so long as men are, so long will Vices be. *Regum ingenia toleranda, neque usui crebra mutationes. Tac.*

## CHAP. XXV.

*A Collection of Political Observations (confirmed by Reason and Experience) advertising Princes, Statesmen, and private Persons how to demean themselves in all Fortunes and Events.*

TO the perfections of Men, three things are necessarily required; Nature, Nurture, and Use: The first giveth capacity, aptness, and understanding; which are graces from above. Nurture, is learning, knowledge, art, or order. Use, is practice, experience, and orderly observation; whereof may be conceived, that Nature alone sufficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good effect, where natural aptness wanteth; and they can frame no perfection, unless experience be also conjoyned. *Nemo nascitur sapiens, sed fit. Sen.*

Ambassadors, Negotiants, and generally all other Ministers of mean fortune, in conversation with Princes and Superiors, must use great respect, shewing themselves rather ceremonious then presumptious, and acknowledge their obligation great, for the favor

favor and grace, they finde in those which might command them.

It is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success; for oftentimes some enterprises attempted by good Counsel, end unfortunately; and others unadvisedly taken in hand, have happy success. Who so then commendeth inconsiderate Counsels for their fortunate event, thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know, and by experience have proved.

In Actions publick and every other matter of great moment, the beginning is well to be considered: For afterwards it lieth not in our power, without dishonor to abandon what was begun.

The time doth not always serve, nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what we would; yet who so doth expect every opportunity, shall either attempt nothing at all, or if he do, the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage.

When any resolution is taken, either with over-great haste, or too much affection, seldom it receiveth good success: For he that doth the one, hath no leisure to consider; the other transporteth the minde so as it cannot

cannot conceive more then that which presently presseth.

To these we adde others, I mean some of them that have leisure, and are void of affection, yet for want of natural capacity, or for continual negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to pass.

Who so desireth to be beloved in a Commonwealth, must rest content with that which men do give, and the Laws allow him to take: So shall he neither incur danger nor envy; for indeed, that which is taken or extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make men hated.

Arms, Laws, and Religion, may not in any well governed State be dis-joyned; for every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united.

In actions of War, courage and conduct are of great necessity; yet all good Government consisteth in using the Vertues Moral; and in handling the matter of Martial Policy, it is fit to imitate the proceedings of antient and approved Captains.

Among Mortal Men, there is nothing more common then to believe the estate of one man to be better then an other; for hereof it cometh, that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel, then to enjoy his own with rest.

The

The ſtate of Princes is good being well uſed; ſo is the fortune of private men, if therewith they be contented. The rich-man liveth happily, ſo long as he uſeth his riches temperately; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants, is rich enough.

Whenſoever a man is ſo dangerouſly diſtreſſed, as either proceeding or ſtanding, he liveth in like peril, then doth it behove him in any wiſe, to reſolve upon action. The reaſon is, that ſo long as nothing is done, the ſame accidents that cauſed his dangers, do ſtill remain in their former force; but if he endeavor to enterpriſe ſomewhat, either he may meet with means to make him ſecure, or at the hardeſt, ſhew himſelf of ſo great courage and wit, as he dare and can attempt a way to do it.

It ſeemeth a thing of great difficulty, or rather impoſſible for any Prince or Magiſtrate to eſchue the evil ſpeech and bad report of men; for if they be good and vertuous, then they incur the backbiting of leud perſons; if evil, then will all good men exclaim againſt them.

All Commonwealths ought to deſire peace, yet it is neceſſary ever to be prepared for the war; becauſe peace diſarmed, is weak, and without reputation: Therefore

fore the Poets feign, that *Pallas* the Goddess of Wisdom did always appear armed.

Every Prince (well advised) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in such sort, that by his affability and vertue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily, then for pay or hope of preferment. For otherwise doing, whensoever the Prince shall want means to pay, the Subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in prosperity become arrogant, nor in contrary Fortune retire, or complain of the small favor he findeth: For (till death) love and life remain at the Princes Commandment.

Where poor men finde Justice, evil men are punished, Measures and Weights be just, Youth well nurtured, and old folk free from avarice, there is the Commonwealth good and perfect.

In War between Neighbors, neutrality is commendable; for by that means we eschue many troubles and great expences, so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength, as we need not to fear the victory of any: For so long their discord is our security, and oftentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation.

The cheif reasons to move War, are, the

Justic

Justice of the Cause, the Facillity of Success, and the Profit of the victory.

In all Humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the Council of Men unto present necessity, and never to expose security to manifest peril, nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained.

It is the nature of men having escaped one extream, which by force they were constrained long to endure, to run headlong into the other extream, forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean.

The multitude is inclined to innovation, and easily induced by false perswasion, and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders.

Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror; yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived, that fear by little and little vanisheth, and Security recovereth the place.

Whoso findeth himself contemned, or not respected, becometh discontent; which humor in generous mindes, breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations, whereof audacious attempts have followed, cheifly in persons of authority and reputation; for he that hopeth no good, feareth no evil: Yet true it is, that dangerous enterprises, the

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the more they be thought upon, the leſs hope they give of good ſucceſs, for which reaſon conſpiracies not ſuddainly executed are for the moſt part revealed or abandoned.

All people do naturally imitate the manners of their Prince, and obſerving his proceedings reſolve to hate or love him: But if they happen once to hate the Prince, then his doings, good or evil, are afterwards not good; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people, then every bad action is reputed a vertue: as though he could not be induced to do amiſs without good cauſe or reaſon.

Greatly are Princes deceived if in the election of Miniſters they more reſpect their own particular affection, then the ſufficiency of the perſon elected.

A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incombred then ſtrengthned, unleſs the ſame be after well governed; and ſeldom is it ſeen that a principality by ill means gotten, hath bin long injoyed.

As to the perfection of the whole body ſoundneſs of head only ſufficeth not, unleſs the other members alſo do their office; even ſo it is not enough that a Prince be faultleſs, but it behooveth alſo that the Magiſtrates

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and Miniſters ſhould perform their duty.

Great Princes rarely reſiſt their appetites, as for the moſt part private men can: for they being alwaies honored and obeyed, do ſeldom with patience indure the want of any thing reaſonable, as being perſwaded that what they deſire is juſt, and that their Commandment hath power to remove all difficulties.

All men are naturally good when no reſpect of profit or pleaſure draws them to become evill. But this worlds corruption, and our frailty is ſuch, as eaſily and often for our particular intereſt we incline to the worſt; which was the cauſe that wiſe Lawmakers found out reward and puniſhment: the one to incite men to good, the other to fear them from being evill. *Tam benè quam malè facta premunt. Mart.*

A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Eſtate by three means. Firſt, he practiſeth to hold all Subjects in extream awe, and to be baſely minded, to the end they ſhould want courage to take arms againſt him. Secondly, he kindleth diffidence and diſcord among the great men; thereby to remove occaſion of conſpiracy and combination. Laſtly, he holdeth them diſarmed and idle, ſo as they neither know nor can attempt any thing againſt him

To govern, is nothing elſe but to hold

Subjects

Subjects in love and obedience: for in respect of the end, they ought not, and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty.

The Laws and Ordinances of a Commonweale made at the beginning thereof when men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill; and therefore new Laws are made according to the accidents which happen.

The discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods, because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich: but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor; for they being equal, do indeavor to aspire to equall authority.

A Prince that desireth by means of his Ambassador to deceive an other Prince, must first abuse his own Ambassador, to the end he should do and speak with more earnestnes, being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his Master is simple which happily would not, were he privy that his Princes meaning were to dissemble. This course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false.

For the performance of conditions in treaty

treaty of Peace or League of Amity, the Promiſes, Vowes, and Oathes of Princes are of great effect; yet becauſe fidelity in a man is not ever certain, and time doth daily offer occaſions of variation, there is no aſſurance ſo ſecure and good as to ſtand ſo prepared as the Enemy may want able means how to offend.

To reſolve in matters doubtfull, or anſwer requeſts which we are not willing to grant, the leaſt offenſive way is not to uſe direct denial, but by delaies prolong the time and ſo in place of effect, afford good expectation.

The old Proverbe ſaith: *Magiſtratus virum oſtendit*: which is no leſs true then ancient: for men in ſuch fortune are occaſioned not only to make proof of their ſufficiency, but alſo to diſcover their affections; and the more their greatneſs is, the leſs reſpect they have to contain thoſe paſſions which are natural.

Albeit great troubles and continual adverſity ſeem inſupportable; yet is there nothing more dangerous, then ouermuch proſperity; and being preſſed by new appetites, they diſturb their own ſecurity.

In ſpeaking of occurrents doubtfull, it is alwaies wiſdom to fain Ignorante, or at leaſt alledge that we beleive them not: for

moſt commonly they are utterly untrue, or far other then vulgarly is believed.

The Actions of men are commonly liked or diſallowed according to the bad or good ſucceſs: attributing that to Council which ſometimes is due to fortune.

The multitude of men were wont to be more pleaſed with ſuddain then ſlow reſolutions; and many times accompt thoſe enterpriſes generous, which are raſhly and inconſideratly attempted.

Great difference there is between Subjects deſperate, and others which are only diſcontented: for the one deſire nothing bue preſent alteration, which they indeavor with all hazard: the other wiſh for innovation, inciting any motion or practice. becauſe their intent is to attend time, and that occaſion may preſent it ſelf.

A benefit beſtowed on him who thinketh himſelf greatly injured, doth not ſuffice to raze the ſame out of his memory, cheifly if the benefit be given at ſuch time as no meer motion but neceſſity may ſeem the occaſion thereof.

That Peace ought to be deſired which removeth ſuſpition, which aſſureth us from perill, which bringeth quiet certain, and acquitteth us of expences: But when it worketh contrary effects, it may be called a dan-

a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull truſt, not unlike a perilous poyſon miniſtred in lieu of a wholſom Medicine.

The effect of things, and not externall ſhow or ſeeming, ought to be regarded; yet it is incredible what great grace is gained by courteous ſpeech and affability: the reaſon whereof is as I ſuppoſe, that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then indeed he is worthy, and conſequently holdeth himſelf injured when ſoever he findeth men not to afford him like eſtimation.

Men ought in any wiſe, to refrain to doe or ſay any thing which may offend, for which reſpect it were great folly either in preſence or abſence to utter diſpleaſing ſpeech unleſs neceſſity inforceth.

The matters whereof Councellors are cheifly to conſider, be five. The Princes revenue, Peace and Warr, Defence, Traffick, and what Laws are to be made.

In giving Council divers things are to be obſerved; but amongſt them are two of moſt importance. Firſt, it behooveth, that he who is Counſelled ſhould be wiſe; for ſeeing Council is nothing elſe but a certain conſiderate diſcourſe of things to be done or not done, if he who is to take Council be not of diſcretion, then will he refuſe all good advice offered, and rather Incline to

that which his own fancie affecteth, becauſe the want of Judgement draweth him to take pleaſure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true, will follow that which is evill and falſe : ſo on the other ſide if he that giveth Council be not faithfull, then will he a Thouſand waies diſguiſe and diſſemble the truth, and conſequently miſcarry the mind of him that is Counſelled: yea in the end utterly abuſe him.

The affairs and proceedings of the world are ſo variable and accompanied with ſo many chances and changes, as impoſſible it ſeemeth to judge what is beſt : therefore experience enformeth, that the conjectures of the moſt wiſe prove vain and uncertain. I therefore miſlike the Judgment of thoſe men, that will let ſlip opportunity of preſent good ( though it be ſmall ) for feare of a future evill, notwithſtanding it be greater, unleſs the evill be very near at hand, or certain. For if that doe not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was deſired.

Whenſoever a general opinion is conceived of the ſingular vertue and knowledge of any man, although he be indeed ignorant and far unworthy that accompt, yet it is hard to remove ſuch a ſettled conceipt:

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the reaſon is, that men having at the firſt given credit to common report, do make thereof ſo deep an impreſſion as afterwards without great difficulty cannot be removed.

The Bodies of Men, Munition, and Mony may juſtly be called the ſinews of War, yet of them the two firſt are more neceſſary, for Men and Arms have means to find Mony and Meate: but Mony and Meate cannot ſo eaſily find Soldiers and ſwords.

One wiſe Generall having but a Thouſand men, is more to be feared and eſteemed then twenty Commanders of equall Authority: for they being commonly of divers humors, or judging diverſly, do never, or very rarely what is to be done, and conſequently loſe much time before any reſolution can be taken.

A Prince of mean force ought not in any wiſe to adventure his Eſtate upon one daies fight: for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory: but if he loſe, he is utterly ruined.

The moſt part of men are delighted with Hiſtories, for the variety of accidents therein contained; yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and finde done by others; being perſwaded that imitation is not only hard but impoſſible, as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their

Motion or Order, and Power, which they anciently had.

The Nature of men is such as will not endevor any thing good, unless they be forced thereunto: for where liberty aboundeth, there confusion and disorder follow. It is therefore supposed that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious: but good Lawes inforce them to be honest; for if men were of themselves good, then Laws were needless.

There are two kinds of Adulation: The First proceedeth from a subtil malice: The Second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving; the other hath no further design then a respect or fear to offend. Whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound. Whoso bindeth himself to flattery, doth thereby bewray his intent, either to gain, or not to lose that he hath. For the person flattered is alwaies superior to him that doth flatter, or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead. It may therefore be inferred that only men of base and miserable condition, and such as cannot help or hurt, be free from flatterers. And contrariwise magnanimous and fortunate folke, proud men and such as content themselves with their present estate, are seldom found to be flatterers.

Every

Every wiſe Prince doth preſuppoſe that times of trouble may come, and that all ſuch occaſions he ſhal be forced to uſe the ſervice of men diverſly qualified. His ſtudy therefore is in the mean time ſo to entertain them as when thoſe ſtorms ariſe he may reſt aſſured to command them; for whoſoevet perſwades himſelf by preſent benefits to gain the good will of men, when perills are at hand, ſhall be deceived.

In ancient times Princes and Governors were wont when peace and ſecurity were moſt like to continue, to find or fain occaſions to draw their Subjects to fear, to the end that doubt might move them to be more carefull of their own weldoing; for well they knew it a general defect in men to be reachleſs, and never willing to uſe induſtry; unleſs by neceſſity they were conſtrained.

All Hiſtories do ſhew, and wiſe Polititians do hold it neceſſary, that for the well governing of every Commonweal it behooveth to preſuppoſe that all men are evil, and will declare themſelves ſo to be when occaſion is offered; for albeit ſome inconvenience doth lie hid for a time, it proceedeth from a covert occaſion, which for want of experience was not found untill time the Mother of Truth diſcover it.

Neutrality is always a thing dangerous and diſallowable, becauſe it offendeth all parties: He that is ſtrong looketh to be aſſiſted in his greatneſs; and he that is weak not being defended, holdeth himſelf offended: the one is not aſſured from Foes, and the other holdeth no friends.

Albeit neutrality procure preſent quiet and ſecurity, during the troubles of others; yet after the ſame falleth out a diſadvantage, becauſe it entertaineth a certain falſeneſs, and ſo in ſhort ſpace will be perceived; not unlike thoſe men that borrow upon uſury; for albeit they enjoy a certain time, without trouble or charge, yet the ſame being ſpent, and the day of payment come, they then feel the great danger which their ſhort pleaſure hath purchaſed.

Whoſo examineth all humane actions ſhall find that in eſchewing one inconvenience, we preſently incur another. As for example, if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty, it behooveth to have the ſame fully r. pleniſhed with people, and well armed, and ſo being, they are not eaſily governed. On the other ſide, if our Country be not well peopled, or diſarmed, then it is eaſily holden in obedience; yet therwith ſo weake that it can neither increaſe the bounds therof, nor defend it ſelfe. It is therfore neceſſary

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in all our deliberations to consider what inconvenience is least, and choose that, as the best: for to find all perfect, void and secure of suspect or imperfection, is impossible.

A Prince being instantly required to take part with other Princes, the one being in arms against the other, if he deny both, incureth suspicion of both, and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them; so as either of them shall accompt him an enemy, and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged; and the other holding him suspected will not acknowledg his Friendship.

It is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit, and seeing the success of some others to be such as without cause or desert are aspired to dignity, thereby uncouraged they promised to themselves the like: Nevertheless being entred into the course of their design, and finding many crosses and impeachments, they do not a little repent their over-weening and presumption, but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize; neither can I think that the vertue or sufficiencie of any man without the favor of the heavens can advance him; for as the Poet saith, *Nec velle juvat, potiúsve nocet, si fata repugnant.* Who-

Whoſo ſerveth a Prince far from his preſence, ſhall with great difficulty content him. For if he commit any error, it ſhall be aggravated: beſides that the inſtructions ſent unto him cannot be particularly conceived, becauſe the State of worldly things doth daily alter. Alſo to ſerve alooffe, is a thing full of danger and far from reward: which inconvenience may for the moſt part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Princes perſon.

Let no man that cometh to ſerve in Court, aſſure himſelf by his wiſdom to be advanced or eſchew all encounters. Neither is he to bear himſelf ſo careleſs as to commit all to fortune, but be perſwaded that this wordly life is like to a voyage by Sea; wherein albeit Art with the favor of the wind may do much, yet can we not aſſure our ſelves to arrive ſafe in the Haven appointed; for daily experience doth ſhew, that ſome ſtrange ſhips in the calmeſt weather, are drowned or impeached by the way, when others much weaker and diſarmed paſſe ſecurely.

Among men worthy of commendations, thoſe have merited beſt that firſt planted true Religion: next they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths; the third place is due to ſuch as have augmented or enlarged

larged their dominions; laſtly learned men deſerve fame and memory: and as every of theſe are worthy of fame and honor; ſo ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce Atheiſm, or the ſubverſion of kingdoms, or are become enemies to Learning and Vertue.

Whoſoever taketh in hand to governe a Multitude either by way of liberty, or principality, and cannot aſſure himſelf of thoſe perſons that are Enemies to that Enterpriſe, doth frame a State of ſhort perſeverance: yet true it is that ſuch Princes be infortunate, as for their own ſecurity are inforced to hold a courſe extraordinary, and have the multitude their enemy; for he that hath few foes may with ſmall diſhonor be aſſured; but he that is generally hated can by no means live aſſured; and the more cruelty he uſeth, the weaker his principality proveth.

In commending another man great moderation is to be uſed; for as contumely offendeth him againſt whom it is uſed; ſo great praiſe, beſides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that ſpeaketh it, the ſame doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it. For ſelf love which commonly poſſeſſeth men, cauſes the good or evil we hear, to be meaſured with our own. And conſe-

conſequently every man that is touched with like deſerts and defects, doth grow offended that his commendation is not ſet forth, and feareth leſt his imperfection ſhould be diſcovered.

It is often, or rather ever ſeen, that the force of Leagues not uſed in their firſt heat, becomes cold; becauſe Suſpition ſoon entereth, which in ſhort ſpace will deſtroy whatſoever was concluded, and may not without long time be rejoyned.

The power of Ambition which poſſeſseth the mindes of men, is ſuch, as rarely or never ſuffereth them to reſt: The reaſon thereof is, That nature hath framed in them a certain diſpoſition to deſire all things, but not to obtain them; ſo as our deſires being greater then our power, thereof followeth diſcontent and evil ſatisfaction. Hereof alſo proceedeth the variation of Fortune; for ſome men deſiring to get, and others fearing to loſe that they have gotten, do occaſion one man to injure another, and conſequently Publick Wars do follow; by means whereof, one Countrey is ruined, and an other inlarged.

Princes of great power, and cheifly thoſe that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to be much inclined to the Wars, as well to win unto them-

themſelves honor, as alſo to get poſſeſſions for their Sons; which manner of proceedings did oftentimes remove ſuch diſturbance as the plurality of Brethren bringeth. Theſe and other reaſons induced Princes to attempt War againſt thoſe Kingdoms, which in their opinion ſeemed eaſily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend litle; for by colour thereof they may the rather juſtifie their proceedings.

When a Prince deferreth to anſwer an Ambaſſador, it proceedeth from ſome of theſe reſpects; either becauſe he will take time to reſolve himſelf of ſomewhat whereof he doubteth, or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded, or that he eſteemeth not the Prince that doth demand, or that he diſdaineth the perſon by whom the demand is made, or elſe that he intendeth to hear from his own Miniſters to be better reſolved: Wherefore a diſcreet Negotiator ought in ſuch caſes to conſider which of theſe reaſons move the Prince where he is employed, to entertain him with delays, and make his diſpatch accordingly.

The ſufficiency of good Counſellors conſiſteth in four things.

Firſt, They ought to be wiſe and skilful how to handle their affairs, directing all doings

doings to publick commodity.

Secondly, To be juſt in their proceedings, giving to every one that which to him appertaineth.

Thirdly, To be ſtout, and void both of partial reſpects and fear.

And laſtly, To be temperate and moderate in their deſires.

Whoſo deſireth to govern well and ſecurely, it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great Princes, and to conſider ſeriouſly of their deſigns: For it is a matter of ſmall difficulty to live in peace with him who deſireth our amity, and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us.

The intelligences that Princes ſtudy to attain, are procured by divers means: Some are brought by report, ſome vented by converſation and ſounding, ſome by means of eſpials; but the moſt ſure and credible accurrents, are thoſe which come from Ambaſſadors, cheifly thoſe that either for the greatneſs of their Prince, or their own Vertue, be of moſt reputation. For thoſe men converſing daily with great perſonages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wiſdom, and the order of each mans proceedings, yea, of the Prince himſelf, may with commodity attain unto mat-

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ters of importance ſooner then they that are Writers of rumors, or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come.

Whenſoever a people is induced to commit ſo great an error, as to give reputation to one onely man, to the end he ſhould oppreſs all thoſe great men whom they hate, they thereby give him opportunity to become their Prince; and ſo being aſſiſted with their favor and aid, he may likewiſe extinguiſh all the reſt of the Nobility; and they being extirpated, he will alſo endeavor to tyrannize over the people, by whoſe help he aſpired.

So many as are not conſenting to the Tyranny, reſt enemies to the perſon of the Tyrant, who can by no means gain the love of all. For impoſſible it is, that the riches of any Tyrant ſhould be ſo great, and the Honors he can give ſo many as may ſatisfie all. Hereof it cometh, that thoſe Tyrants that are favored of the people, and disfavored of the Nobles, are moſt ſecure; becauſe their Tyranny is ſupported with a greater ſtrength (having the multitude their friends) then is the Tyrant whom the humor of the Nobles onely hath advanced.

A dangerous thing it is in all Commonwealths by continual puniſhing, to hold the mindes of Subjects in ſuſpition; for men

men ever fearing their ruine, will (without respect) determine to save themselves, and as men desperate, attempt innovation. All capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly, and as it were at one instant, so to assure the mindes of men from further molestation.

The intent of every wise Prince that maketh War, either by election or ambition, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself, and not impoverish his own people or Countrey.

He that inlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increase his power; but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion, shall thereby grow great; otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost, and consequently he ruineth himself: For who spends more in the War, then he gains by Victory, loseth both labor and cost.

Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed, that no necessity how great soever, do perswade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer, are more easie then is such a resolution.

A Prince sheweth his ruine at hand, whensoever he beginneth to break the Laws

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and Customs, which are antient, and have been long time obeyed by the people of his Dominion.

That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy, ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors, then them whom he hath much injured: For these want opportunities, the other do not; and both their desires are as one; because the Appetite of commanding, is always as much or more then the desire of revenge.

Whensoever a Prince discovers a conspiracy, he must well consider the quality thereof, measuring the force of the Conspirators with his own; and finding them many and mighty, the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled, until the Princes power be prepared to oppose them; otherwise he hazardeth his own security.

It hath been by long experience found better to send one General to an Army, though he be of mean sufficiency, then to give the same Authority to two or more excellent personages with equal Commission.

He that coveteth to be over-much loved, often times becomes contemptible; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared, is ever hated: And to hold the mean be-

tween them, cannot be exactly done, because nature will not so permit.

Whoso aspireth to any dignity, must resolve himself to endure the envy of men, and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him, though they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter, relinquish his hope; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of Fortune, shall after with facility arive where he designed.

In giving Council to a Prince or Commonwealth, and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence, no other mean is to be taken then that the Counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion, and never to affirm any thing as a resolution, but with modesty to defend that he speaketh; so as the Prince which follows his advice, may seem to do it voluntarily, and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the Council.

A discreet Captain being in the Field against the enemy, of whose vertue he hath had no proof, ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he is, and not to enterprise any general adventure, to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers.

Albeit

Albeit Fraud be in all actions deteſted, yet is the ſame in Martial enterpriſes commendable and glorious: For that Captain who compaſſeth his deſigns by wit or ſtratagem, is no leſs commended then he that vanquiſheth the Enemy by violence and Force.

In times of extremity, when reſolution muſt be taken for the having or utter loſſe of the State, then no regard is to be had of Juſtice or Injuſtice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honor or Ignominy, but rather ſetting aſide all reſpects, that courſe is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men.

Whoſo deſireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is paſt; for the World hath ever bin in in a circular revolution: Whatſoever is now, was heretofore and things paſt or preſent are no other then ſuch as ſhall be again: *redit orbis in orbem.*

A Prince that deſiteth to obtain any thing at the hand of another, muſt if it be poſſible urge a ſuddain anſwer, and lay before him that is moved, a neceſſity to reſove preſently, giving him to underſtand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and ſuddain indignation.

There is nothing more difficult, doubtful and dangerous then to attempt Innovation:

for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of ſuch quality, maketh all thoſe his Enemies which lived well under the old order, and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties, which coldneſs proceedeth chiefly of incredulity; for men are not eaſily induced to beleeve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good.

There is no art nor other knowledg ſo ſeemly and neceſſary for a Prince as the Art Military with the ordinances and diſcipline thereof: for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth, and ſuch a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes, but often advanceth private men to that dignity.

The deep impreſſions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out; it is alſo to be remembred that injuries be done all together: For they offend the leſſe, and wil be forgotten the ſooner; but benefits ſhould by little and little be beſtowed, ſo ſhal the memory of them long continue.

A ſmall pleaſure or diſpleaſure preſently done, doth move more then a great good turn beſtowed in times paſt; for the taſte of things preſent doth make a deeper impreſſion in the minds of men, then doth the memory

mory of things paſt, or expectation of things to come.

It is a matter of ſmall difficulty to ſound the diſcontentment of other men. For every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deſerving of friends, and likewiſe how much or how little foes can do, if we have patience to hear, which patience is the beginning of all good ſpeed; but he that delighteth to ſpeak much, and hear little, ſhall ever inform others more then he himſelf can learn.

Among other dangers which a Prince incurreth by being diſarmed, the greateſt is, that thereby he becometh contemptible; for no compariſon there is between men armed and them that are diſarmed: and no reaſon there is that he that is armed ſhould yield obedience to him that is diſarmed, neither is it like that a Prince diſarmed can be ſecure from his own Subjects armed.

A Prince ignorant of Martial knowledg, among other misfortunes cannot be eſteemed or truſted of his own Soldiers; it behooveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exerciſe arms, which may be done by two meanes; the one by action of body, the other by contemplation of mind. The body may be exerciſed in hunting, hawking, and ſuch like paſtimes;

thereby to be made apt to endure travel; his mind likewise may be informed by reading of Histories, and the consideration of actions performed by excellent Captains, observing the occasion of their victories or losses, to the end he may imitate the one, and eschew the other.

He that doth not as other men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, shall thereby rather incur peril then preservation; for whoso laboreth to be sincerely perfect and good, shall necessarily perish, living among men that are generally evil.

A Prince that useth liberality to his prejudice, ought not to regard the infamy of Miserable, because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal, and so may declare himself to be, having by parsimony increased his power, and therefore without imposing upon the people, may defend himself from all such as will make war; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing, who are infinite, and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth, who are but few.

There is nothing that consumeth it self like to liberality; for if it be long used, it taketh away the meanes to continue it, and consequently doth make men poor and basely

basely minded : or else to eschew poverty they shall be forced to extortion and become odious.

It is better to incur the name of covetous (which is a scandal without hate) then with desire to be accounted liberal, deserve the infamie of oppression (an ignominy accompanied with hatred.)

A Prince ought to be slow in believing, and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared, but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless, nor over much diffidence render him intolerable.

Whoso observeth, shall see that men offended, less respect him whom they love, then him whom they fear. For love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation, which because men are evill, useth to be by every occasion of profit broken. But fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth.

A Prince that holdeth in the field an Army wherein are great numbers of Soldiers, ought not to care though he be accompted cruell: For without such an opinion conceived, he cannot keep his forces united, nor apt to attempt any enterprize.

Men for the moſt, do uſe rather to judg, by their eyes, then by their hands, for every one may ſee, but few can certainly know. Every one ſeeth what thou ſeemeſt to be, but few can underſtand what thou art indeed; and theſe few dare not oppoſe themſelves to the opinion of many which have the Majeſty of Eſtate to defend them. Alſo in the actions of all men, and chiefly Princes, from whom is no appellation, the end is ever obſerved. *Machiavel.*

A Prince being forced to uſe the condition of beaſts, muſt among them make choice of the Fox and the Lyon; for the Lyon cannot take heed of ſnares, and the Fox is eaſily overcome by the Wolves; it behooveth him therefore to be a Fox to diſcover the ſnares, and a Lyon to terrify the Wolves.

A Prince newly advanced cannot obſerve thoſe rules which are the cauſe that men be accompted good; he being many times conſtrained for defence of his ſtate to proceed contrary to promiſe, contrary to charity, and all vertue; and conſequently it behooveth him to have a mind apt to alteration, as the wind and variation of fortune ſhall direct; yet ought he not to abandon the good, if ſo he can, but be ready to uſe what is evil if ſo he ſhall be inforced.

Every

Every Prince ought to have two ears, the one Intrinſick in reſpect of Subjects, the other Extrinſick in reſpect of forraine Potentates, from whom he may be defended with good Arms, and good Friends: Alſo matters Intrinſick will ever ſtand well ſo long as all things abroad reſt firm.

A Prince that is favored of the multitude, need not to doubt conſpiracy; but contrariwiſe where the people is generally diſcontented, and hateth the Prince, then may he reaſonably doubt every thing, and every perſon; for no man is ſo poor, that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend,

When any occaſion is preſented to have that thou deſireſt, fail not to lay hold thereof: For theſe worldly things do vary, and that ſo ſuddenly, as hard it is to aſſure our ſelves of any thing, unleſs the ſame be already in hand: On the other ſide if any trouble threaten thee, defer it ſo long as thou maiſt; for time may occaſion ſome accident to remove all dangers.

The Prince that doubteth the fidelity of his Subjects, muſt of force build Fortreſſes; but he that feareth forreign force more then his own people, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howſoever it be, that Prince that deſireth generally to be reſpected and eſteemed, muſt perform ſome notable enterpriſe

priſe, and give teſtimony of great Vertue and Valor.

A Prince ſhall do well at all times to be counſelled ſo as no man do preſume to give counſel but when the Prince doth ask it. It is alſo to be noted, that he who is not of himſelf wiſe, cannot be well counſelled of others, unleſs happily he yield to ſome wiſe men the Government of his whole Affairs. For good counſels from whomſoever they proceed, ſhall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the wiſdom of the Prince to proceed from the counſel of others.

He that taketh delight to be employed in Publick Affairs, muſt by all means endeavor to continue in ſuch Services: For oft one buſineſs dependeth on another, whereunto the *Florentine* Proverb may be applied, *Di coſa, naſce coſa, & il tempoſe governa.*

Some men have not onely deſired, but alſo compaſſed honor and profit; yet being in poſſeſſion of both, were not therewith ſo ſatisfyed as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguiſh the immeaſurable ambition wherewith many men are poſſeſſed.

By experience I have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not, or ſpend preſently in hope of future gain. Therefore Merchants during the adventure

venture of their goods, do not increase domesticall expences, but fearing the worst assure what is in hand.

For such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous, to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy, there is nothing better then a life retired from daily conversation, & chiefly of the multitude. *Fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi.*

The end that moveth a Prince to make war, is to enrich himself, and impoverish the enemy: neither is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty, and make the enemy weak; consequently whersoever thy victory doth impoverish thee, or thy gain therein doth weaken thee, it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed. And that Prince is by victory enriched, that can oppress the enemies power and become Master of his goods and possessions. And that Prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself, and the spoyls and possessions are not taken to the use of the Prince victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate, and in victory unhappy; for if he be vanquished, then must

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must he indure the offence by foes; and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by Friends: which as they be leſs reaſonable, ſo are they alſo leſs ſupportable; becauſe he is ſtill by impoſitions forced to burthen the Subjects, whereof may be inferred, that the Prince having in him any generoſity cannot juſtly rejoyce at that victory which cauſeth the Subjects to lament.

Who ſo deſireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compaſs his deſire, either by intreaty, preſents, or threatning; for ſo ſhall he to whom the requeſt is made, be moved either with compaſſion, profit, or fear: Neverthel-ſs with covetous and cruel men, and ſuch as are in their opinion mighty, none of theſe can prevail. And conſequently in vain do they labor, that go about by ſuit to ſtir them to pity, by gifts to gain them, or by threats to fear them.

Who ſo is perſwaded that any Commonweal can continue diſunited, doth greatly deceive himſelf: True it is, that ſome diviſions do maintain the Eſtate, but other do indamage the ſame They which do harm, are ſuch as with Sects and Pertakings be accompanied; they which help without Sects and Pertakings be maintained. A wiſe Governor therefore, albeit he cannot ſo exactly

exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the State, yet may he take order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens of every Estate, may aspire to Reputation, either by private or publick means. Reputation by publick means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining victory in some Battel, or surprising of some City; or else by performing some Ambassage diligently, prosperously: but private Reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and protecting them from Magistrates, giving them money, advancing them unworthily to Honor and Office; and by great Feasts, entertaining the multitude; of which manner of proceeding, Sects, Factions, and Partakings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, so the other without Faction is profitable; because the same is founded on Common welfare, and no private profit: And albeit among Citizens of this sort, will oft arise great hate, yet wanting followers for their particular profit, the State shall not be indangered, but rather strengthned; for every man endeavoring to deserve well, will hold himself within the bounds of Civil life, and by Vertuous Merits labor to be advanced.

To

To perſwade or diſſwade particular perſons, is a matter of no difficulty: for if words ſuffice not, yet Authority will prevaile: but hard and perillous it is to remove a falſe opinion conceived by a whole multitude, for therein faire ſpeech and no compulſion muſt be uſed.

The beſt means which wiſe Captains can uſe to make their Soldiers reſolute, is to take from them all hope, which reſolution may alſo be increaſed with the love of our Country and confidence in the Captain: for confidence groweth by the valor of men, and Diſcipline in former Victories, and truſt repoſed in the leader. The love of our Country is naturall, but the affection we bear to the Captain proceedeth rather from his vertue, then the benefits he hath beſtowed. Neceſſity alſo may do much, and chiefly that where no choiſe is left, but either overcome by armes, or dye in deſperation.

There is nothing of ſo great force to hold an Armie united, as the reputation of the Captain, which proceedeth only from his vertue; for neither Dignity nor Authority without Valor can work that effect.

The firſt care that a Captain muſt have, is to hold his Soldiers well puniſhed and paied; for where payment faileth, puniſhment ought not to be inflicted: and conſequently

quently no reaſon it is to puniſh him for robbery, whom want of pay enforceth to ſhift; but where the Soldier is payed, and not puniſhed (offending) then will he without reſpect become inſolent towards his Captain. whereof inſue Mutinies, Diſcord, and utter Ruine.

It is a cuſtom very honorable not to promiſe more then thou wilt aſſuredly performe: yet true it is that whoſoever is denied (though juſtly) doth reſt illcontented; for men indeed are not governed by reaſon: otherwiſe it is for him that promiſeth: and ſo good promiſes ſhall ſtand in ſtead of performance; beſides that, he may find excuſe enough, becauſe the moſt part of men are ſo ſimple, that faire words alone have power to abuſe them, cheifly when they proceed from a perſon of Reputation and Authority. The beſt way therefore is not to promiſe preciſely, but entertain the Suitors with anſwers general, and full of good hope: yet not ſuch as ſhall directly and abſolutely bind.

The greateſt and moſt material diſpleaſures that uſe to ariſe between the Nobility and People, are cauſed by the diverſity of humors, the one laboring to command, the other endevoring not to obey; ſo as all troubles and diſorders in every Common-weal

weale do thereof receive nutriment.

The City which is maintained rather by Factions then Lawes, ſo ſoon as one Faction is become ſtrong and without oppoſition, the ſame of neceſſity muſt be divided in it ſelf: for thoſe particular cauſes which were at the firſt taken, are not of force enough to maintain it.

It is the nature of men not to indure any diſcommodity, unleſs neceſſity do thereunto enforce them: which may apparently be perceived by their habitations; for as the feare of Warr draweth them to places of ſtrength (for their defence) ſo that perill being paſt, they do for the moſt part remove themſelves to inhabit Countries of more commodity and profit.

It may ſeem ſtrange, and no even meaſure (yet approved by experience) that where many offend few are puniſhed. Alſo petty errors are ſeverely corrected, but great and grievous crimes be rewarded. In like manner, where many receive wrong, few ſeek revenge. For injuries univerſal, are with more patience then particular offences endured.

All or the greateſt part of men that have aſpired to riches or power, have attained thereunto either by force or fraud: and without they have by craft or cruelty gained,

ed, to cover the foulneſs of their fact, they call purchaſe as a name more honeſt. Howſoever he that for want of will or wit uſeth not thoſe means, muſt reſt in ſervitude and poverty. The reaſon thereof is that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes, ſo ſhe diſpoſes them rather to Rapine then honeſt Induſtrie, and more ſubject to bad then good endeavors: hereof it cometh, that one man eateth an other, and he that is weakeſt muſt alwaies goe to the worſt.

Where neceſſity forceth, boldneſs is reputed Wiſdom, and in great enterpriſes perill is not to be made accompt of. For thoſe attempts that begin with danger, alwaies end with honor, or reward; alſo from one perill there is no way to eſcape, but by entring into another.

A wiſe man ought not to deſire to inhabit that County where men have more Authority then Lawes. For indeed that Country deſerves to be deſired where every one may ſecurely enjoy his own; not that, where with facility it may be taken away; and that friends for feare to loſe their own, are inforced to forſake them.

Some Magiſtrates either by over great zeale or ignorance take a courſe of Rigor, which being for the preſent favored, they

are ever the more imployed, as men meet to extirpate inconveniences.

But thereby the Subjects are often drawn into desperation, and consequently have recourse unto armes, as their uttermost refuge. In this case a wise Prince for appeasing the people is forced to disallow his Ministers, and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment.

A Prince naturally suspicious, and having about him persons inclined to envie, is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency: which danger they cannot eschew, because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the Prince.

Who so cannot endure both envy and hate, must refrain to enterprise great matters: for great honors being desired of many, it behooveth him that aspireth unto them, to be for his dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority albeit the same be well used, yet they who hate or envie (perswading themselves it might be better handled) indeavor to oppress that power, as fearing it will be worse.

Among other things which worketh the inconveniences of Commonweales, Ambition

bition and Deſperation are cheif; of both, Deſperation is worſt: for Ambition may attend occaſion; Deſperation will not, as that cannot endure delaies. Hiſtorians deſiring to write the actions of men, ought to ſet down the ſimple truth, and not ſay any thing for love or hatred: alſo to chuſe ſuch an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare happineſs of the time.

In commending or diſallowing the actions of men it is a courſe very requiſite to conſider the beginning, the proceeding, and end: ſo ſhall we ſee the reaſons and cauſes of things, and not their bare events only, which for the moſt part are governed by fortune.

It is a matter of much neceſſity, that every man, and chiefly a Prince ſhould in his firſt actions, give ſome teſtimony of Vertue; for falling at firſt into obloquie, doe he well or ill, all is ill taken.

The Cuſtome of the Common people is to judge rather by their eyes then by their eares: which is the cauſe they allow more of external ſhew then inward vertue: and true it is, where excellency of mind, and beauty of body concur, the commendation due to ſuch a perſon is far the greater.

*Gratior eſt pulchro veniens è corpore virtus.*

A Prince or great perſonage that conſtantly endureth adverſity deſerveth great praiſe: yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himſelf modeſtly in his happineſs. For miſeries are oft born with patience, but felicity corrupteth.

To be deſcended of Princes or great Parſonages, is a matter of meer fortune, and ſo to be eſteemed: but adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of men; therefore ſeemeth incorrupt and ſeldom abuſed.

It hath been long obſerved, and is a rule which rarely faileth, that he ſhall be ever ſuſpected of the Prince in poſſeſſion, whom men accompt worthy to be a Prince in reverſion.

It hath been a uſe very ancient to give credit to Aſtrologers, and other ſuch perſons who by their ſtar-learning or blind divination, take upon them to tell of things to come. The reaſon thereof is that the moſt part of men beleive that ſooneſt which they leaſt underſtand; And if they ſee the event of a prediction though it hapneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premiſed, thereupon they ſettle ſo firme an impreſſion, as albeit many other faile, yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed.

Liberality

Liberality is a vertue which gaineth love, but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuſeth. To caſt away and conſume is ſoon learned, but to give in good order few have the skill.

In time of ſuddain mutiny, conſpiracy, and offence of people, the wiſeſt reſolution is not to oppoſe force to prevent fury, but rather give ſpace for the bad to amend, and the good to conſent: for treaſons prevaile on the ſudden, but good Councel gathers forces by leaſure.

Mature deliberation ought ever to be uſed; but when armes are to determine, ſpeedy execution is the beſt: becauſe no delay in that enterpriſe is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended.

Who ſo is pleaſed to obſerve the proceedings of men in Authority, ſhall obſerve that ſome of them hold a plain courſe without reſpect: others projecting for time to come do forecaſt how to hold their preſent good fortune or at leaſt to eſcape danger: for they miſtruſting preſent proſperity and fearing a change, prepare beforehand ſome private friends to oppoſe againſt publick hatred: whereof may be inferred, that no care is taken of innocency, but every one ſtudieth how to paſs without puniſhment.

In Captains and all Military Commanders, three things are required, Vertue, Discipline, and Authority; but in private Soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth; for by due obeying, and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained; and the Army in danger is alwaies most valiant, which before the danger is most quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded. To advise and direct must be the Captains care.

It is a matter of no great moment, yet alwaies worthy the noting, that any exterior behavior, or garment presenting pride or greatness, chiefly in persons lately advanced, though no man be thereby interessed or injured, doth move in others a certain offence: for the nature of man is such, as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye, and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves

In all enterprises of Warr, (if present necessity doth not otherwise require) leisure and deliberation ought to be used; for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom, to take the advantage of other mens folly.

All men that are to consider of great actions, ought to be informed whether that which

which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweale, honorable to themſelves, and eaſy to be effected: or at leaſt not greatly difficult. Alſo he that perſwadeth, is to be examined whether beſides bare words and Counſel, he will joyn his own perill; and if fortune favour the attempt, to whom the principal glory ſhall redound.

The perils which accompanie private enterpriſes, are far unlike to thoſe which he doth enter that aſpireth to principality. For in private attempts a man may pauſe or proceed as he will; But to him that aſpires to Empire there remains no middle courſe, but either by Victory to triumph as a Prince; or being vanquiſhed to endure death as a Traytor.

Let no man in his proſperity, give much credit to common applauſe or ſervice aſſured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience: for the baſe people are learned in no leſſon, only without difference of truth or falſhood to flatter men in Authority, and with ſhouts and words of great rejoycing make ſhew of great affection.

As overmuch haſte is dangerous, ſo too great delay oftentimes proveth diſadvantagious: for albeit conſultation ought to

foregoe action, yet to diſpute long and in the end reject the advice of either ſide, or take a middle courſe ( whith in caſes of doubt and danger is worſt) was ever accompted great diſcretion.

There is no courſe more comely, nor any reſolution ſo well beſeeming a wiſe man, having made proof of his own vertue (and finding in age no fortune due to ſuch effect) as to retire himſelf from the Court and company; for ſo ſhall he ſhun the inconveniences of contempt and the diſcommodity of travell ( *Jucunda ſenectuti otia* ) yet true it is that whoſo hath lived a Prince or governed as a publick perſon, cannot expect ſecurity in a private eſtate.

Whenſoever danger draweth near, and terror is at hand, all men look about, but none willingly adventure: For in ſuch caſes every man will give Council, but few will take part of the peril.

In Commonwealths where Sects or Partialities be, the Leader of any ſide is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he unable to moderate the Victory: For to ſtir up diſſentions and troubles, the worſt man moſt commonly bears the ſtroke; but peace and quietneſs are not eſtabliſhed but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue.

It may ſeem ſtrange and contrary both to courteſie

courteſie and Chriſtian profeſſion, that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them, then of benefits received by them. The reaſon thereof is, that Thankfulneſs is accompted a burden, but Revenge is ſweet, and reckoned a great gain.

Of reconciled foes, and ſuch as know that our harms were cauſed by their means, we oft-times expect favor, as perſwaded that new friendſhip will repair the loſs of old diſpleaſure: But the matter doth ſeldom ſo fall out; for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate thoſe whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made beholding. *Quos læſerunt oderunt. Tac.*

To common perſons and ſuch as are ignorant in matters of State, every Taxation and Impoſition ſeemeth heavy or ſuperfluous; yet the wiſer ſort know, that the end of all publick endeavor is to confirm people in Peace, and Peace cannot be maintained without arms; nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Impoſitions.

As fortunate folk are envied, ſo are the poor contemned; which rule reacheth alſo to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For ſeldom is it ſeen, that thoſe people are aſſaulted where nothing is to be gained, and whoſe baſe Beings afford no other ſpoils then blood and beggery. Wiſe-

Wiſemen have obſerved that in matter of State, and the managing thereof, three things are eſpecially to be looked unto: The firſt is, Occaſion; the ſecond, the Intentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that ſlippeth away ſo ſoon as Occaſion; nothing ſo difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth; nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate deſires.

It hath been ever a courſe obſerved by wiſe Princes, but much more by *Ariſtocraties* and *Popular States*, againſt Force and Fury of the multitude, to defend themſelves with Silver and Gold.

How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a vertuous life, and give daily example of Piety and Juſtice, appears apparantly in the proceedings of the *Roman* Biſhops; who by the well-doing of ſome few of them at the firſt, became greatly honored; but afterwards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which men did bear to the ſanctity of their lives failing, it was impoſſible of ſo contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects.

The ſucceſs of the War cheifly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince, which declining, the vertue alſo of the Soldiers faileth: Likewiſe the fidelity of the people decayeth.

decayeth, and their money to maintain the War, ceaſeth; contrariwiſe, the courage of the enemy is increaſed, they that ſtood doubtful become reſolved, and every difficulty augmenteth.

The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in reſpect of Wiſdom and Valor: Yet true it is, that for the moſt part, they accompt them the wiſeſt men that can beſt accommodate themſelves to their humor.

The greateſt diſtreſs and difficulty which can come to any Army, doth proceed of theſe cauſes: Want of money, ſcarcity of victuals, hatred of people, diſcord of Captains, diſobedience of Soldiers, and their flying to the enemy, either of neceſſity or freewil.

A Prince or great Magiſtrate having long maintained the reputation of Wiſdom and Vertue, muſt take heed that no raſh or dangerous reſolution do taint the Honorable Fame of his former life: For to be tranſported with anger againſt his own profit, is lightneſs; and to eſteem ſmall dangers more then great, is want of judgment.

A Prince or Perſon of great eſtate, muſt be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing: For little ſincerity and truſt is looked in his actions, of whom there is an opinion of craft and falſhood conceived.

Experience

Experience hath always proved, that whatſoever the moſt part of men deſire, rarely cometh to paſs: The reaſon hereof is, that the effects of Humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number, the end and ſucceſs cannot be other then as pleaſeth the few that are to direct them.

There is nothing more dangerous then to enterpriſe a War, or other actions of importance upon popular perſwaſion; for ſuch expectations are vain, and ſuch deſigns fallible: Alſo the Fury of the multitude is great, when danger is little or far off; but perils growing great and near, their courageth quaileth. as they whoſe Paſſions have no rule or meaſure.

It is ſtrange to ſee how apt men are to doubt diſpleaſure threatned by enemies, cheifly when they draw near; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand, and eſteem leſs then is fit of things preſent: Alſo to make ſmall accompt of thoſe that are far from them, becauſe divers remedies may be hoped as well by time, as other accidents.

The offenſive words or anſwers of indignation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit diſpleaſure into the

mindes of them againſt whom they are ſpoken: For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more eaſily appeaſed: Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits.

To judge right of other mens merit, ſeems of great difficulty; for time and tryal is thereto required; alſo it is not eaſie to anſwer the expectation of men, but oft-times inconſiderate, and not meaſured in due proportion.

It is a part of great diſcretion to divide the ſeaſons of Affairs and Vacations: For as it fitteth well a Prince or Perſon of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedful, and auſtere: So thoſe Offices performed, all ſhew of authority and ſad looks ought to be ſet apart; for by that means, neither courteous behavior ſhall detract from the Reverence due to his place, nor ſeverity diminiſh the love which to his Behavior appertaineth.

Magiſtrates muſt look into all things, but not exact all things to rigor. Light faults may be pardoned, but great offences ſeverely corrected; yet not always proceeding to puniſhing, but oft contented with repentance. To be bitter in rebuking is alſo fit for a Magiſtrate, ſhewing himſelf ſowre to the bad,

bad, and ſweet to the good; framing both Countenance and Condition according to the merit of men; and be perſwaded that it is more honeſt to offend, then to hate.

Soldiers muſt be encouraged in all Fortunes to ſtand reſolved, and not to be danted with any paſſed miſadventure; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge; which commonly cometh to paſswhere mens mindes are united: For common danger muſt be repelled with union and concord.

Among other reaſons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged, Neceſſity and Diſtreſs doth oft inforce them: For as men of vertue perform the actions of Arms for Honor, ſo the coward muſt do them for his ſecurity.

All Enterpriſes attempted by Arms, are honorable; but thoſe that are done in Countreys remote, are more praiſable: For the leſs they be in knowledge, the greater is the glory to atchieve them.

To be truly and faithfully loved, is a thing greatly to be deſired; for Terror and Fear are weak works of Affection: For they being taken away, he that ceaſeth to fear, will ſoon begin to hate; and as they that by force are kept under, obey with ill will; ſo they that govern without Line juſtly, rule againſt Right.

Some men either deſerving to be accompted

ed of excellent wiſdom, or ſingular in that skill whereof they make profeſſion, do ordinarily love the proceedings of others, taking that advantage of their ill ſucceſs; yet ſure it is, that Diſaſter and unhappy Event of ſome Actions, proceed not of diſorder, nor Humane imperfection, but from a certain fatal Fury, which neither Council nor Conſtancy of Men can withſtand.

It is a matter of much difficulty, or rather impoſſible for any Prince to maintain the Law, Civil or Military without ſeverity: For where men hope to be eaſily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily where mens actions are preciſely fitted, there do they live in over great aw, and Hatred doth always accompany ſuch Severity. The beſt courſe therefore is to puniſh offences ſeverely, and reward vertuous Merits liberally; ſo ſhall Fear be converted to reverend reſpect, and none have cauſe to complain: For as it lies in each mans power to ſhun offending, ſo is it in their power alſo to deſerve well, and merit reward.

Whoſoever after mature deliberation, hath reſolved what courſe to hold in the Action he hath in hand, muſt not after repent or fear any difficulty: For ſuch thoughts would break the vigor of the Minde, and impeach the proceedings of that which was reſolved.

reſolved. And albeit ſome differences do happily ariſe, yet muſt he believe that every other courſe would have been accompanied with the ſame or greater impediments.

Yong men for the warmneſs of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more willingly enterpriſe Actions rather honorable then ſevere. But old men as well for that their heat is cooled, as alſo for having attempted many things in vain, make choice of Enterpriſes ſevere rather then thoſe that are followed with Fame and Glory.

The greatneſs of one Prince is nothing elſe but the ruine and diſtreſs of another: Likewiſe his ſtrength is the weakneſs and oppreſſion of others.

Some Conqueſts are of ſuch quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honor; yet a modeſt refuſal becomes his greater glory.

The Dignity of Magiſtrates is not aſſured without Arms; for when Obedience faileth, no other means is left to continue a people united.

As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Princes ſtrength, ſo is the ſame their own ſecurity: For as by the Princes Authority the people are governed, ſo by their conſent he is maintained.

Three

Three things men covet with immoderate desire, Lands, Riches, and Honors; but as seldom they compass their full content, so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other then they wished.

Strange it is, yet by experience proved true, that in time of danger, Fortune or (rather Destiny) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men, as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken.

No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unless the same be used to foreign assaults: For wanting foes without, some inward enmity will arise; not unlike to strange bodies of men, which being secure from external injury, are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed.

As every Pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the course of his Ship; so every Governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of State are in peaceable times to be handled: But when Tempests are, and Subjects bent to Sedition; the one requires an excellent Sailer, the other the aid of some excellent Wisdom.

It oft happens, that publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship; so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Countrey, or draw our dearest friends into danger: In which case we are to prefer

publick respect, before particular Obligation.

The nature of base people is such, as either they obey slavishly, or command insolently: For liberty being the mark whereat they aim, is by them of that quality, neither moderately desired, nor discreetly continued; and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found, who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people. *Dux rebus motis, facile invenitur. Salust.*

Experience hath oft proved, that Men in best Fortune, and such as esteem themselves most secure, even then fall soonest into disadventure, because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned, and not regarded.

To enter needless dangers, was ever accounted Madness, yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress, bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security.

The divers Adventures which happen to men, may well inform that much better it is, cheifly in Arms, to be governed by Reason then by Fortune.

A certain Peace is ever accounted better security then Victory hoped or expected. *Melior tutiorque certa pax quàm sperata victoria. Livi.*

If

If to our Prosperity God were pleased to add the Grace of Wisdom, we should thereby judge not onely of what is past, but also of all that can succeed hereafter.

Rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings, unless first we have felt the deceits of Fortune. Discord or Dissention in any State or City, offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will: For the humor of Sects and Partialities is such as the weaker Faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers, then yield to the Dominion of an adverse party.

Ancient Customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away. Fortune which altereth all things, will by little and little wear them out of use.

To be oft in sight, and converse much with men, breedeth a kinde of Satiety: therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and Authority to be retired, lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable Estate.

The natures of men not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others most prone to Envy; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them.

Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen

or Subject, be suffered to aspire to such greatness, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no order there is of more necessity, then that every man of what quality soever, may be without respect accused and judged.

For conservation of particular Greatness and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, then to have felt the force of every Fortune.

It is the quality of wise men onely, to know how to use Prosperity, and never to trust too much to the favors of present Happiness. A man well advised in his Prosperity, beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent; nor must he believe in his own present felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He onely is to be reputed a man, whose minde cannot be puft up by prosperity, nor dejected by any adverse Fortune.

Men of Cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent Speeches, but wise men laugh them to scorn.

The way whereby a Prince eschues the hate of Subjects, is, not to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted, unless the same be accompanied with Confiscation (which a Prince is rarely forced to use) it seldom causeth him to become odious.

A Rule moſt certain it is, that he who commands any thing unpleaſing, muſt by ſevere means cauſe it to be obſerved; and who deſireth to be obeyed, muſt know how to command: And he onely knows how to command, that doth compare his own force with thoſe that are to obey; wherein finding a proportion, then he may boldly proceed, otherwiſe forbear.

In Actions of difficulty great courage is to be uſed, and who ſo compaſſeth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by mildneſs, nor command by affability: He therefore that is of nature ſoft, ſhould do beſt, to refrain all extraordinary commands, and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his milde ſpirit; becauſe ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince or his Magiſtrates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.

When Neceſſity preſſeth, deſperation is deemed Wiſdom, and generous mindes do not accompt of danger, becauſe thoſe attempts which begin with peril, do for the moſt part end with glory.

He that endeavors to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which thoſe labor to pull down, of Force worketh his own undoing. All Commonwealths alter from order to diſorder, from

diſorder to order again; for Nature having made all worldly things variable, ſo ſoon as they have attained their utmoſt perfection and height, they muſt deſcend; ſo from good they fall back to evil, and from evil they return to good. War begets quiet, quiet idleneſs, idleneſs diſorder, diſorder ruine; likewiſe ruine order, order vertue, vertue glory and good fortune.

Wiſe men have obſerved, that Arms were before Learning, and Captains before Philoſophers; for good and well regulated Armies having gained victory, eſtabliſhed reſt and ſecurity, whereof the Study of Letters and Liberal Sciences enſued.

That Country deſerveth to be loved of all men, which loves all men indifferently, and not that Countrey which reſpecting the beſt part, advanceth a few: No man therefore is to be blamed, if for ſuch cauſe he deſire rather to abandon then embrace his Countrey.

Commonwealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies ſimple ſome reſemblance; And as in theſe, many infirmities grow, which without violent Medicines cannot be cured; ſo in the other many miſchiefs ariſe, which a good and godly Patient ſhould offend to leave uncured, though therein he uſe both force and fire.

Thoſe

Thoſe Wars be moſt juſt which are moſt neceſſary; and thoſe Arms are moſt merciful where no hope of help remains but in them onely.

In Actions which promiſe either publick glory, or private honor, men may be reaſonably perſwaded to adventure life and living, becauſe great hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to recover that Peace which War hath conſumed: But where men are no leſs oppreſſed by inſolency of Commanders, then by inſolency of Foes, there is the calamity doubled, and of two evils the danger of War ſeemeth leaſt; for that hath end, the other is infinite.

Who ſo perſwades himſelf to be no leſs eſteemed in evil then good Fortune, is deceived: For promiſes made, during diſtreſs, are rarely performed, unleſs the ſame neceſſity continue.

The intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to inrich himſelf, and impoveriſh the enemy: Neither is Victory for other occaſions ſought, nor the poſſeſſions of the enemy to other end deſir'd, then to make themſelves mighty, and their enemy weak. It follows then, that ſo oft as the victory impoveriſhes them, or the gains weaken them, either they paſs or come ſhort of that mark whereat the War was aimed.

Ancient and wel-governed Commonwealths were wont by their Conqueſts to fill the Treaſuries with Gold and Silver, to give reward to Soldiers, to ſpare the people from Tributes, to make Triumphs and Publick Feaſts: But in later times the Wars have uſed, firſt, to conſume the Treaſure, and after impoveriſh the people without aſſuring them from their enemies.

A Prince or State that leaves promiſes unperformed, by reaſon of unexpected impediments, and for no ill intent, ought not to be blamed: Neither are ſuch accidents any juſt cauſe or colour why friends ſhould abandon their confederates.

Where Magiſtrates govern juſtly, Subjects obey dutifully; where private perſons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Empire; there is the Commonwealth bleſſed, and the people fortunate.

CHAP.

# CHAP. XXVI.

*Maximes of State, or Prudential grounds and Polemical Precepts, concerning all Eſtates, and forms of Policie in times of Peace or War, &c. confirmed by ſelect Narations, and Hiſtorical Parallels.*

ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded, or elſe they are made by ſtrangers: Of the firſt are *Athens* and *Venice*, of the other *Alexandria* and *Florence*.

The fortune of every City builded, and vertue of the builder, appeareth by choice of the place, and quality of Laws: for as fertile places occaſion men to be ſlothfull, unleſs by good laws they be forced to labor, ſo barrenneſs compells them to induſtry; which reaſon induceth wiſe men to plant habitations in either: Examples of the firſt are *Ferrara* and *Rome*, of the ſecond *Raguſa* and *Genoa*.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by ſome one excellent

cellent man, and at an instant; or else they were ordained at sundry times according to such accidents as befel. Example, the laws of *Sparta* made at the beginning *Lycurgus*, the laws of *Rome* at sundry times.

The government of every City in time becomes corrupt; Principality changeth into Tyranny: the Optimacy is made the government of the people; and the Popular estate turns to licentious disorder; which instability or alteration moved some Lawmakers to take order that in the government of their City there should be a mixture of all three, and was the cause that the policy of *Sparta* continued 800 years, when the popular State of *Athens* endured not one hundred. Example, the laws of *Sparta* made by *Lycurgus*, and the Laws of *Athens* by *Solon*.

Whoso taketh in hand to frame any State or government, ought to presuppose that all men are evil, and at occasions will shew themselves so to be. Example, the envy of the people of *Rome* to the Nobles, and their Insolency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings governd; but the *Tarquins* being banished, opportunity was thereby offerd that the malice of the one and the other became discovered.

The divers honors of the Nobility and people

people, the one desiring to command, the other not to obey, are the cause of continual troubles, unless some third mean there be of more authority then either, to bridle the force of both. Example, The Kings in *Rome* expulsed, forthwith arose much mutiny, and could not be suppresst till the *Tribuni Plebis* were created; whose authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done.

Some States endeavor to enlarge their dominions, and some others labour only to maintain that estate they antiently possest. Example of the first was the City of *Rome*, of the second *Sparta*.

All States desiring to live at liberty, think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects: First that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State; or if they do, they shall be presently and without respect punished. Secondly by liberty of accusing, every man hath meanes to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not, unless it were lawfull to take such an ordinary course, and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular revenge, or callingin forreign forces. Example, *Coriolanus*

and

and *Appius*, *Claudius* at *Rome*, *Lucannone* at *Chinsi*, *Francisco Valeri* in *Florence*.

As accusations are in every State necessary, so slanders are dangerous, and worthy of punishment; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders, is, that the one is publickly performed before Magistrates, with good proofs and Witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and places of repair without Witness and Justification, so as every man may be slandered, but few are orderly accused. Example, *Appius Claudius* accused by *L. Virginius*; *Furius Camillus*, slandered by *Manlius Capitolinus*.

The only meanes to suppress Slander is, to give authority to some persons of repute to compel every slanderer to become an accuser; and if the accusation prove true, then to reward the accuser, or at least not to punish him. Example *Manlius* the slanderer of *Camillus* for his untrue information punished.

A rule most certain and assured it is, that every Kingdom and State at the first well framed, or after well informed, doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man, who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment

he

he happily uſeth ſome extraordinary violenc or proceedings; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar, deſerves commendation. Example, *Romulus*, *Lycurgus*, *Cleomenes*.

There lives no man ſo ſimple or wiſe, ſo wicked or well diſpoſed, but prefers thoſe perſons that are praiſable, before thoſe that are blamable: notwithſtanding for that well near all men are beguiled in diſcerning what indeed is good, deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwiſe; they ſuffer themſelves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a courſe which merrits rather infamy then commendation. Example, every man wiſheth himſelf *Timoleon* or *Ageſilaus*, rather then *Dionyſius* or *Phalaris*; rather a *Titus* or *Trajan*, then *Caligula* or *Vitellius*.

Who reads Hiſtories treating of great Actions ſhall perceive that good Princes indeed are more ſecure and better defended by the love of the People, and Fidelity of Counſellers, then were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. Example, of all thoſe Emperors which raigned after *Ceſar* untill *Maximinus* the greateſt number were for their vices taken and ſlain, only *Galba* and *Pertinax* excepted who were good Emperors.

A Prince of great knowledge both in Armes and Wisdom so firmly setleth the foundation of Government, as albeit his successor be of the less vertue, yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor: but if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first then the second, then all that is past goeth to ruine. Example, The Martial Valor of *Romulus* was the cause that *Numa* might governe safely in peace: which *Tullus* could not have done, had he bin unlike to *Romulus*; nor should *Bajazet* Emperor of *Turky* have enjoyed the state of his Father *Mahomet* and left the same to his posterity, if *Selim* his son had not been more like to his Grandfather then to *Bajazet* his Father.

The succession of two excellent Princes, cheifly if they be of long life, works wondrous effects: the like is seen in Optimacies or Popular States, where the Governors successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding. Example, The first appeared in *Philip* of *Macedon*, and *Alexander* his Son, the second in the Consuls of *Rome*.

In every State where Soldiers are not, the fault thereof proceeds from the Governors. Wise Princes were therefore wont even in times of Peace to cause warlick exercises

ercises to be used; for without them the most warlick nations become not only ignorant in Martial knowledge, but also effeminate. Example, *Pelopidas & Epaminondas in Thebes*, and King *Tullus* in *Rome* as well in peaceable as troublesome times used exercise of Armes.

No Prince or State well advised, hazards his whole estate upon the valor of some few persons, nor ought to strength of straight places where the Enemy is to pass. Example, *Tully* King of *Rome*, & *Metius* King of *Alba*, condiscended that three of their Nobility for either side chosen should enter Combate, and that Nation which were victorious should command the other. *Francis* the French King going to recover *Lombardy*, was by the *Switzers* attended into two or three places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulse him, but the King taking another way, passed securely and prevaild.

Every State well governed doth reward men of good merit, and punish all offenders; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent, the same man ought notwithstanding his former service, be punisht. Example, The same *Horatio* that in Combat gained the victory against the *Albani*, having insolently slain his own sister,

ſiſter, was notwithſtanding his egregious Act and the freſh memory thereof, called into triall of his life, and with great difficulty obtained pardon: and *Manlius* who had with great glory ſaved the Capitol, for moving ſedition in *Rome*, was after from the ſame caſt down headlong.

Every wiſe man having performed any great ſervice to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with ſuch recompence as it ſhall pleaſe the Prince or Country to beſtow: meaſuring the ſame according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. Example, *Horatius Cocles* for having loſt his hand in defence of the bridge of *Rome*, and *Mutius Scævola* ſuffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King *Porſenna*, were rewarded with a ſmall portion of Land; and *Manlius* that defended the *Capitol* from the *Galleys*, had no greater reward then a little meaſure of meale.

Ingratitnde is a vice ſo natural and Common, as not only private perſons, but Princes and States alſo either through covetouſnes or ſuſpition are therewith infected. Example, *Veſpaſian* proclamed Emperor, was chiefly aided by *Antonius Primus*, and by his helpe prevailed againſt *Vitellius*; in reward of which ſervice *Veſpaſian* removed

removed him from the command of his Army and gave that honor to *Mutianus*. *Consalvo Ferranos* having taken the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, was first remov'd from his Command of the Castles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into *Spain* where in disgrace he ended his life *Collatinus Tarquinius* who with the aide of *Brutus* suppressed the *Tarquins* of *Rome*, and with him *Pub. Valerius* were banisht for no other cause but for being of the name of *Tarquin*; theother because he built a house upon mount *Cœlio*.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilfull or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity then the quality of their offences deserves, seemeth necessary: for men of honor suffer nought by the infamy which evill service doth bring. It is also to be considered that a great Captain being cumbred with many cares, cannot proceed in his actions couragiously if he stand in daily doubt to be punisht for every error that hapneth. Example, *Sergius* and *Virginius* were before *Veio*, the one part of the Army on the one side of the City, the other not far from the place. *Sergius* being assaulted by the *Falisci* was not aided by *Virginius*, neither would he require his help, such

was the envy the one bare to the other; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment. Likewise when *Varro* by his ignorance, received an overthrow by *Hannibal* at *Canna*, he was nevertheless pardoned and honorably welcomed home by the whole Senate.

Whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the State, it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof, then to seek by sudden violence to suppress it. Example, *Cosmo de Medici* having gained extraordinary reputation in *Florence*, the Citizens imagined, that to suffer the same to increase, was dangerous, and therefore they banished him: Which extream proceeding, so offended the friends of *Cosmo*, being the stronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in *Rome*, where *Cesar* for his vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared; and they that feared, not considering their force to be inferior to the power of *Cesar*, endeavoring to oppress him, were the occasion of his greater glory.

In every Republick, an excessive Authority given to one or two persons for long time, proveth dangerous, cheifly when the same

same is not restrained. Example, The Dictatorship given to *Cesar* for life, was an occasion to oppress the Liberties of the *Romans*. The same effect was before that time like to follow the *Decemvirate*, by suffering *Appius Claudius* to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is such, as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded; neither do they willingly accept of mean Office, having before sate in higher place: Yet the Citizens of well-governed States, did not refuse as well to obey as command. Example, The victory the *Romans* obtained against the *Veienti*, *Q. Fabius* was slain, having the year before been Consul: Nevertheless he then served in meaner place under *C. Manilius*, and *M. Fabius* his own Brother then Consul.

There is nothing more strange, yet by experience proved true, That men in adverse Fortune be much grieved, and in prosperity also discontented; which is the reason, that not being forced to fight for necessity, they will nevertheless contend for Ambition; and that humor doth as well possess those that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The people of *Rome* having by the Authority of the *Tri-*

*bunes* obtained to make themſelves ſecure from oppreſſion of the Nobility, forthwith required, That the Honor and Office of State might be alſo imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have their part of Lands by force of *Lex Agragia*, which was at laſt the overthrow of the *Roman* liberty.

It ſeemeth that people diſpleaſed with ſome Innovations hapned in the State, do ſometime without juſt Reaſons complain of thoſe that govern: Not unlike to a ſick man who deemeth that the Phyſician, not the Fever, is the cauſe of his grief. Example, The people of *Rome* were perſwaded that the Ambition of Conſuls was the cauſe of continual War, therefore required that no more Conſuls ſhould be; yet were they content that certain *Tribunes* ſhould command with like Authority, ſo was nothing altered in the Government but the Governors title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man ſo much, or ſo ſoon as the immoderate deſire of Honor; in ſo much as men of honeſt mindes and vertuous inclinations are ſometimes by Ambition drawn to abuſe that goodneſs whereunto they are inclined. Example, *Appius Claudius* having lived long an enemy to the Multitude, hoping by their

their aid to continue his Authority of the *Decemviri* in *Rome*, became their Friend, and disfavored the factions of great men. Likewise *Q. Fabius* a man of singular vertue, being also called to that dignity by *Appius* self, adulterated his nature and became like unto him.

Seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth, many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief, they stand silent. Example, The *Romans* at the death of *Virginia*, were gathered together armed upon Mount *Sacro*, and being asked by the Senate, for what cause they so did? no answer was made, until *Virginio* Father of the Virgin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as head of the people, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather meer Madness it seemeth to desire any thing, and tell beforehand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted. Example, The *Romans* required of the Senate that *Appius* and the rest of the *Decemviri* should be delivered into their hands, being determined to burn them all alive.

The first part of their request seemed

reasonable, but the end thereof unreasonable.

A course very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accusing and punishing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that stands always looking for some trouble, becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation. Example, The *Decemviri* being oppresst, the Tribunes authorised in their place, endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the *Decemviri*, and many other Citizens also, whereof great inconveniences arose, and much danger would have ensued, had not a Decree propounded by *M. Duillius* been made, that for one year no *Roman* Citizen should be accused.

Strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security, lay the injuries which they fear upon other men; as though it were necessary, either to offend or be offended. Example, The *Romans* among themselves, united and strong, always endeavored to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles likewise being perswaded they were strong, labored to oppress the people: Which humors were the cause of continual troubles.

To make estimation and choice of men fit to govern, the best course is to consider

in

in particular; otherwiſe it might be imagined, that among the Multitude or meaner people, they being the greateſt number, might be found ſome perſons of more perfection. Example, The people of *Rome* deſiring that the Conſulſhip might be given among them as men of moſt merit, did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor; but being come to election, and every mans vertue particularly conſidered, there could not be among the Multitude onely one found fit for ſo great a place; and therefore the people themſelves conſented, that the dignity ſhould ſtill remain as it was.

To perſwade a Multitude to any enterpriſe, is eaſie, if that which is perſwaded, doth promiſe either profit or honor; yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loſs or diſadvantage. Example, The *Romans* perſwading themſelves that the ſlow proceeding of *Fabius Maximus* in the War, was both chargable and cowardly, required, That the General of the Horſe might direct the War; which courſe had ruined *Rome*, if the wiſdom of *Fabius* had not been. Likewiſe when *Hannibal* had divers years raigned in *Italy*, one *M. Centenius Penula*, a man of baſe birth, yet a Soldier of ſome repute, undertook that if he with ſuch Vo-

luntiers as would follow him, might have authority to fight, he would within few days deliver *Hannibal* either alive or dead: Which offer was by the Senate accounted raſh, yet for fear to offend the people, granted; and *Pennla* with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.

To appeaſe a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more ſpeedy or ſucceſsful, then if ſome perſon of great quality and reſpect, preſent himſelf to the people, and by his wiſdom lay before them the damage of their Diſcords, perſwading them to Peace and Patience. Example, The faction of the *Frateſchi* and *Arratiati* in *Florence*; the one ready to aſſault the other. *Franciſco Soderini* Biſhop of *Voterra* in his Epiſcopal Habit, went between the parties and appeaſed them: Alſo Count *Egremont* by the Authority of his wiſdom and preſence, ſuppreſt a great mutiny in *Antwerp* between the Martiniſts and Papiſts.

A people corrupted, do rarely or never obſerve any Order or Ordinance, unleſs by force of ſome Princes power they be thereto inforced; but where the Multitude is incorrupt and religious, all things are done juſtly, and without compulſion. Example, *Camillus* at the victory againſt the *Urienti*,

vowed

vowed that the tenth part of the pillage ſhould be offered to *Apollo*; but the Senate ſuppoſing that the people would not conſent to ſo great a Contribution, ſtudied to diſpence with that vow, and to pleaſe *Apollo* and the people alſo by ſome other means: Whereat the people ſhewed themſelves openly offended, and willingly gave no leſs then the ſum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of *Germany* are occaſioned to make money for any Publick Service, the Magiſtrates impoſe One or two in the hundred on every City, which done, every one is ſworn to lay down ſo much as in his own Conſcience he is able; and he with his own hand, no other witneſs being preſent, caſteth the money into a Coffer prepared for the purpoſe; which he would not, if his own Conſcience did not inforce him.

When any extraordinary occaſion happens to a City or Province, ſome prodigious voice is heard, or ſome marvellous ſights are ſeen. Before *T. Gracchus* General of the *Roman* Army was betraid by *Flavius Lucanus*, the *Aruſpices* diſcovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beaſts ſacrificed; which done, they vaniſhed: which viſion as they divined prognoſticated the Generals death: Likewiſe *F. Savanarola* foretold the coming of King *Charls* the

the Eight into *Italy*: And *M. Sedigius* when the *Galls* first came towards *Rome*, informed the Senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans, crying aloud, *Galli veniunt*.

The multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation; yet unless they be directed by some persons of Reputation and Wisdom, rarely do they joyn in any action of great import. Example, The *Romans* when their City was taken and sackt by the *Galls*, went to *Veio* with determination to dwell there: The Senate informed thereof, commanded that upon great pain, every Citizen should return to *Rome*, whereat the people at first mocked; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril, all in general determined to obey the Magistrates.

In the employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue; for yong men having made tryal of their valor, soon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to serve: Therefore well-governed Commonwealths, preferred Military Vertue before any other respect. Example, *Valerius Corvinus* with others made Consul the Three and twentieth year of his age,

and

and *Pompey* triumphed in his youth.

No wiſe or well adviſed Prince or other State will undertake without exceſſive Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unleſs he aſſure himſelf of ſome Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his paſſage. Example, The *Romans* by aid of the *Saguntines* entred *Spain*, the *Ætoli* called them into *Greece*, the *Hedui* into *France*: Likewiſe the *Palæologi* incited the *Turk* to come into *Thrace*; and *Ludovicus Sforza* occaſioned *Charls* the French King to come into *Italy*.

A Republick deſirous to extend the bounds thereof, muſt endeavor to be fully furniſhed with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by ſuffering ſtrangers to inhabit the City ſecurely; and Force compels people to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demoliſhed or defaced: And impoſſible it is without this order of proceeding, to enlarge any City or make the ſame of greater power. Example, The *Romans* to enlarge their City demoliſhed *Alba*, and many other Towns, and therewith alſo entertained all ſtrangers courteouſly: So as *Rome* grew to ſuch greatneſs, that the City onely could arm Six hundred

hundred and forty thousand men; but *Sparta* or *Athens* could never exceed Twenty thousand, for that *Lycurgus* had inhibited the access of strangers.

A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War, then it profits in Victory, seems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the State. A wise Captain therefore in his actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himself glory. Example, the Consuls of *Rome* did seldom desire Triumph, unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver, and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the Common Treasury.

All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambition or Desire of glory, or else for necessity. Examples, the *Romans* for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent onely to have the obedience of the people; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their Houses, and sometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old Laws. Likewise *Alexander* the Great endeavored to suppress many Princes for his glory, but did not dispossess the people, nor kill them.

Otherwise it is where a whole Nation inforced by Famine or Fury of War, aban-

don their own dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elſwhere. Example, The *Goths* and other people of the North invaded the *Roman* Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their alteration of names did enſue; as *Illyria* now called *Slavonia*, *England* formerly named *Britain*.

A common conceit and ſaying it is, That Money makes the War ſtrong, and is the force and ſinews thereof; as though he who hath moſt Treaſure, be alſo moſt mighty; but experience hath apparently ſhewed the contrary. Example, After the death of *Alexander*, King of *Macedon*, a multitude of *Galls* went into *Greece*, and being there arived, ſent certain Ambaſſadors to the King, who ſuppoſing to make them afraid of his power, ſhewed them his treaſure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the *Galls* before deſirous of Peace, reſolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty maſs of Money. Likewiſe *Darius* ſhould have vanquiſhed *Alexander*, and the *Greeks* might have conquered the *Romans*, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame then Effect, and conſequently deceiveth all thoſe that in ſuch Amity repoſe Confidence.

Confidence. Example, The *Florentines* being assaulted by the King of *Naples* and the Pope, prayed aid of the French King, who being far distant, could not in time succor them; and the *Cedicini* desiring aid of the *Capuani* against the *Samnits*, a people of no force, were deceived.

A Prince whose people is well armed and trained, shall do better to attend his enemy at home, then by invasion to assault his Countrey: But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed, had need to hold the enemy aloof. Example, The *Romans*, and in this age the *Swisses*, being well armed, may attend the War at home; but the *Carthaginians* and *Italians* being not so well furnished, did ever use to seek the enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one time in *Rome* created four *Tribuni Militares* with authority of Consuls, *viz. T. Quintius* after his Consulship, *Cajus Furius*, *M. Posthumius*, and *A. Cornelius Cassus*, amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion, as nothing could be done till their authority ceased, and *M. Æmylius* made Dictator.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain

tain with the Authority of his Princes Commiſſion, Counſel, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the wiſdom of the Prince, then the valor of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of *Rome* to permit no Captains (how great ſoever his victories were) to Triumph, as before that time the Conſuls had done; and even in thoſe days a modeſt refuſal of Triumph was commended. Example, *M. Fulvius* having gained a great victory againſt the *Tuſcans*, was both by the conſent of the Senate and people of *Rome*, admitted to Triumph; but the refuſal of that Honor proved his greater glory.

All they that from private eſtate have aſpired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud be come thereunto, unleſs the ſame be given, or by inheritance deſcended: Yet it is rarely ſeen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft-times ſufficeth. Example, *Agathocles* by ſuch means became Prince of *Syracuſa*; *John Galeazzo* by abuſing his Uncle *Barnabas*, gained the Dominion of *Lombardy*; and *Cyrus* circumvented *Cyaxares* his Mothers Brother, and by that craft aſpired to greatneſs.

Sudden Reſolutions are always dangerous; and no leſs peril enſueth of ſlow and doubtful delays. Example, When *Hieron* Prince

Prince of *Syracuſa* died, the War even then being in great heat between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, they of *Syracuſa* conſulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of *Rome* or *Carthage*. In which doubt, they continued until *Apolloniades* a cheif Captain of *Syracuſa* laid before them, that ſo long delay would make them hated both of *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. Likewiſe the *Florentines* being by *Lewis* the Twelfth required to give his Army paſſage towards *Naples*, muſed ſo long upon anſwer, that he became their enemy, and they forced to recover his favor full dearly.

To govern a State is nothing elſe but to take ſuch order as the Subjects may not, or ought not offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to diſobey, or by affording them ſo great favors, as reaſonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean courſe proveth dangerous. Example, the *Latins* being by the valor of *Camillus* overcome, yeelded themſelves to endure what puniſhment it pleaſed the *Romans* to inflict.

An ingenious and magnanimous anſwer being made unto wiſe Magiſtrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Example, When the *Privernates* had rebelled, and were

were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the *Romans*, they sent certain of the City unto *Rome* to desire pardon; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators asked the *Privernates*, what punishment themselves did think they had deserved: The same, quoth they, which men living in freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Consul thus replied, *Quid si pœnam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus?* The *Privernates* answered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam: Si malam, haud diuturnam.* Which answer was thought to proceed from generous men, and therefore they were not onely pardoned, but also honored and received into the number of the *Roman* Citizens.

All Castles, Fortresses, and Places of strength, be made for defence either against the enemy or Subject: In the first case they are not necessary, in the second dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the Subject, when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of Men. Example, The Castle of *Millan* made by Duke *Francisco Sforza*, incited his Heirs to become insolent; and consequently they became odious; which was also the caus-

that so soon as that City was assaulted, the enemy with facility did possess it.

That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the trust he hath in Fortresses, then the love of Men, shall be deceived: For no place is so strong, as can long defend it self, unless by the love and aid of Men it be in time of necessity succored. Example, Pope *Julio* having drawn the *Bentivoli* out of *Bologna*, built there a strong Castle; the Governor thereof robbed the people, and they therewith grieved, in a short time took the Castle from him. So after the revolt of *Genoa*, *Lewis* the Twelfth came to the recovery thereof, and builded there the strongest Fortification of *Italy*, as well for site as the circumstances inexpugnable. Nevertheless the Citizens rebelled, and within sixteen moneths the French were forced to yield the Castle and Government to *Ottavio Fragosa*.

To build Forts upon places of strength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to small purpose. Example, The *Romans* having suppresst the Rebellion of the *Latins* and *Privernates*; albeit they were people Warlike, and lovers of Liberty; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Castles, nor other places fortified: And the

*Laceda-*

*Lacedemonians* did not onely forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but alſo left their cheif City of *Sparta* unwalled.

The neceſſity or uſe of Fortification, is onely upon Frontires or ſuch principal places where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the fury of ſudden aſſaults may be ſtaid, and time for ſuccor entertained: Otherwiſe, example, the Caſtle of *Millan* being made to hold the State in obedience, could not ſo do either for the houſe of *Sforza* or *France*. *Guido Ubaldo*, Duke of *Velin*, driven from his Dominion by *Cæſar Borgia*, ſo ſoon as he recovered his Countrey, cauſed all the Forts to be demoliſhed: For by experience he found the love of Men was the ſureſt defence, and that Fortifications prevailed no leſs againſt him then for him.

The cauſes of Diviſion and Faction in every Commonweal proceed moſt commonly of Idleneſs and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. Example, The *Vejenti* and *Eliſci* having intelligence of great contention between the Nobility and People of *Rome*, thought that a fit opportunity to oppreſs the one and the other; But the *Romans* informed of ſuch an intention, appeaſed all Domeſtick anger, and by the Valor of their Arms conducted by

*Gn. Manlius* and *M. Fabius* defeated the Enemies Forces.

The means to uſurpe an eſtate disjoynted is firſt before Arms be taken, to become as it were an Arbitrator or a friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to ſend moderate aid to the weak ſide, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as alſo to conſume the ſtrength both of the one, and the other, yet in no wiſe to employ any great forces, for thereby either party may diſcover the intents to ſuppreſs them. Example, The City of *Piſtoia* fallen into diviſion, the *Florentines* took occaſion ſometimes to favor the one, and ſome times the other, that in the end both ſides weary of the War, voluntarily yeilded to their devotion. *Philippo Viſcount*, hoping ſundry times by occaſion of Faction to oppreſs the *Florentines*, did often aſſault them with great forces, which was the cauſe that they became reunited; and conſequently the Duke deceived of his expectation

A great Wiſdom it is to refrain Opprobrious and Injurious ſpeech: for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decreaſe the Enemies force, ſo doth it move him to greater hate, and more deſire to offend. Example, *Gabides* a General of the *Perſians* having long beſieged *Amida*, became

became weary, and preparing to abandon the enterprise, raised his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the *Persians*, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowardise; which undiscreet words so highly offended *Gabides*, as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege, and within few daies win the City. *Tiberius Gracchus* appointed Captain of certain bands of men, whom for want of other Soldiers the *Romans* entertained, proclamed in his Camp, that no man upon pain of death should contumeliously call any Soldier slave, either in earnest or jest. *Nam facetiæ asperæ quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt.* Likewise *Alexander* the great having conquered well near all the East, brought his forces before *Tyre*, they fearing *Alexanders* fury, offered upon honorable considerations to yeild him obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the City, which motion after four Moneths *Alexander* accepted, and so signified by his Ambassador who arriving in *Tyre* was by the proud Citizens slain, whereat *Alexander* grew into Choler and being ready to forsake the siege, staid his forces, and in the end sacked the City and put the people to the sword.

A Prince or any other State being assaulted by an Enemy of far more puissance then himself, ought not to refuse any honorable compositions, chiefly when they are offered; for no conditions can be so base, but shall in some sort turn to the advantage and honor of him that accepts them. Example, *Anno* 1512. certain *Florentines* procured great forces of *Spaniards* to come thither, as well to repossess the *Medici* then banisht, as also to sack the City; promising that so soon as the Army of *Spain* did come into the *Florentine* dominion, the faction of *Medici* would be ready armed to receive them. But the Spaniards being come, found no forces at all to joyn with them, and therefore wanting victual, offered composition. The *Florentines* finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace, whereof followed the loss of *Prato*, and many other inconveniencies. The like happened to them of *Tyre*, as before.

The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered, is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State, for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction: Example, the complaint which the *Galli* made against the *Fabii*

*bii* who ſent Ambaſſadors in favor of the *Toſſani*, not being heard, nor any puniſhment inflicted upon them for fighting againſt the Law of Nations, was the cauſe that the *Galli* were offended with the States, whereof followed the ſack of *Rome*; and the delay of Juſtice in *Philip* of *Macedon*, for not revenging the inceſtuous oppreſſion of *Attalus* to *Pauſanias*, was the motive to murther that King.

Whoſo endeavors the alteration of any State, muſt of neceſſity proceed with all ſeverity, and leave ſome memorable example to thoſe that ſhall impunge the Ordinance of Government newly ſettled. Example, when *Junius Brutus* had by his great valor baniſht the *Tarquins*, and ſworn the People that no King ſhould ever raign in *Rome*: within ſhort time after, many young Nobles, among whom was *Brutus* ſon, impatient of the equality of the new government, conſpired to recall the *Tarquins*; but *Brutus* thereof informed, cauſed his own ſon not only to be condemned to death, but was himſelf preſent at the execution.

As health and ſoundneſs of the hands, legs, and other outward members cannot continue life, unleſs the heart and vital ſpirits within be ſtrong and firm; ſo fortifications and Frontier-defences do not pre-

vail, unleſs the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed: Example, when the Emperor came into *Ital.*, and had with ſome difficulty paſt the confines of the *Venetians* welnear without reſiſtance; his army marcht to *Venice*, and might doubtleſs have poſſeſt the City, had it not been defended with water. Likewiſe the Engliſh in their aſſault of *France*, excepting a few encounters on the Frontires, found no puiſſant reſiſtance within the Realm. And *Anno* 1513 they forced all that State, and the King himſelf to tremble, as oft before they had done; but contrariwiſe the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart, ever held the body of their State ſtrongeſt: for the nearer the enemy approacht *Rome*, the better they found the Countrey armed and defended.

The deſire to command ſoveraignly is of ſo great force, as doth not only work in thoſe that are in expectation of principality, but alſo in them that have no title at all. Example, this appetite moved the wife of *Tarquinius Priſcus* contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father *Servius*, and poſſeſſe his Kingdom, as being perſwaded it were much more honorable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King.

The violation of ancient Laws, Orders, and Customs, under which people have long time lived, is the chief and only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity. Example albeit the deflowring of *Lucrece* was the occasion, yet was it not the cause that moved the *Romans* to take arms against *Tarquin*; for he having before that fact of *Sextus* his Son, governed Tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility, and People, who finding themselves well governed, never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration.

A Prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy, hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors, then those whom he hath greatly injured; because they want meanes to offend; the other have many opportunities to do it. Example, *Perennius* the Prime favorite of *Commodus* the Emperor conspired his death. *Plautianus* did the like to *Severus*, and *Sejanus* to *Tiberius*; for being advanced to so great honors, riches, and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial title, they conspired against the persons of their Soveraigns in hope of the dignity; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth.

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An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared, neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much esteemed, whose Captain is ignorant. Example, *Cæsar* going into *Africa* against *Afranius* and *Petræus* whose army was full of old Soldiers, said he feared them little, *Quia ibat ad exercitum sine ducc.* Contrariwise, when he went to *Pharsalia* to encounter *Pompey*, he said, *Ibo ad ducem sine exercitu.*

A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness, then with over-much austerity and severity. Example, Q. and *Appius Claudius* being Consuls, were appointed to govern the War. To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully; but *Appius* commanding the other with great cruelty, was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheless *Tacitus* seems of contrary opinion, saying, *Plus pœna quam obsequium valet.*

Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits, I say, that a General having power to command men, either they are confederates or Subjects: If confederates or voluntaries, he may not proceed to extream punishment; if Subjects, and his power absolute, they may be governed otherwise; yet

yet with such respect, as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory. Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished, being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default. Neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth. And forced promises which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or never kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive disgrace. Example, *Posthumus* the Consul having made a dishonorable peace with the *Samnits*, was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed. Being arived at *Rome*, the Consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and those few that promised, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to *Samne*, where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all: And Fortune so much favored *Posthumus*, as the *Samnites* were content presently to return him

him to *Rome*; where he became more glorious for loſing the Victory, then was *Pontius* at *Samno* for having won the victory.

Wiſe men have long obſerved, that who ſo will know what ſhall be, muſt conſider what is paſt; for all worldly things hold the ſame courſe they had at firſt. The reaſon is, that as long as men are poſſeſt with the ſame Paſſions with former ages, conſequently of theſe doings the ſame effects enſue. Example, The *Almains* and *French* have ever bin noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury, and Infidelity, and ſo in divers ages, experience hath proved even to this preſent: For perfidious dealing the French have given ſufficient proof, not onely in ancient times, but alſo in the time of *Charls* the Eighth, who promiſed to render to the *Florentines* the Forts of *Piſa*, but having divers times received money, held them notwithſtanding in poſſeſſion. The *Florentines* found the like in the *Almains*; for in the Wars of the *Viſconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promiſed them great forces; in conſideration whereof, he was to receive of the *Florentines* One hundred thouſand Crowns in hand, and as much more when his Army was arived in *Italy*, both which payments were performed;

but

but as ſoon as the Emperor came to *Verona*, he deviſed cavillations of unkindneſs, whereupon he returned home.

A Prince deſirous to obtain any thing of another, muſt if occaſion ſo permit, urge his demand ſo earneſtly and preſs for ſo ſudden and preſent anſwer, as he who is preſt may not have leiſure to conſider how to excuſe himſelf in denial. Example. Pope *Julio* endeavored to drive out of *Bologna* all the *Bentivoli* in which action he thought the aid of the French neceſſary, and that the *Venetians* ſhould ſtand neutral; and by divers meſſengers did ſollicite them to that effect; but not receiving any reſolute anſwer, he thought fit with thoſe few forces he had to take his journey to *Bologna*, whereupon the *Venetians* advertiſed him they would remain neutral, and the French King forthwith ſent him forces as fearing the Popes indignation; likewiſe the *Tuſcans* having formerly deſired aid of the *Samnites* againſt the *Romans*, took Armes ſuddenly and obtained their requeſt which the *Samintes* had before denied.

When a multitude offendeth, all may not be puniſht, becauſe they are too many: to puniſh part and leave the reſt unpuniſht, were injurie to the ſufferers; and to thoſe that eſcape, an encouragement to offend again;

gain; therefore to eschew all extremity, mean courses have bin anciently used. Example, When all the Wives of the *Romans* conspired to poyson their Husbands, a convenient number of them were punisht, and the rest suffered to pass: Likewise at the conspiracy of the *Bacchanals* in the time of the *Macedonian* War, wherein many thousands Men and Women had part, every tenth person only was put to death by lot, although the offence were general, by which manner of punishing, he that suffered, complained on his fortune; and he that escaped, was put in feare that offending again, the same punishment might light upon himself, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battel or great action in Armes ought not to be enterprised without special Commission or Command from the Prince, otherwise the General incurs great danger. Example; *Papyrius* the Dictator punisht the General of the horse in the *Roman* Army, for having fought without his consent, although he had in battaile slain 20000 Enemies without loss of 200 of his own, and *Cæsar* commended his Captain *Silanus* for having refrained to fight, though with great advantage he might. Also Count *Egmont* hazarded the favor of the King his

Master

Master for giving battel to Marshall *de Thermes*, albeit he were victorious: for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the Low Countries depended.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in *Aristocracies* and Popular States, but unto independent Princes an occasion of utter ruine. Example, *Hieron* the first King of *Sicile* in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels, and lived fifty years prosperously in Peace, but his grandchild succeding, refusing all Counsell lost his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain.

In all Monarchies the Senate or privy-Council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity, or men of approved wisdom and understanding. Example, In *Polonia* no man is Counsellor unless he be a *Palatine*, a *Bishop*, a *Castellan*, a *Captain*, or such a one as hath bin Ambassador, and in *Turky* the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four *Bassars*. the two *Cadelesquirre*, the twelve *Beglerbegs*, and Kings son, who in his Fathers absence, is as it were, a president of the *Divano* or *Senate*.

Many Princes Ancient and Modern have used to select out of their Council, two or

three or four at moſt, to whom only they did impart their affairs. Example, The Emperor *Auguſtus* had *Maecenas* and *Agrippa*, *Julius Ceſar*, *Q. Padius* and *Cor. Balbus*, whom he only truſted with his Cipher and ſecrets, being Counſellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The alteration of old Laws or introduction of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithſtanding any appearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wiſe Governors to decree, that ancient Lawes once eſtabliſhed might never be called in queſtion. Example, The *Athenians* decreed that no Law ſhould be propounded to the peop'e without the conſent of the Senate: the like uſe is obſerved in *Venice* where no Petition is prefered to the Senate but by advice of the Sages; and among the *Locrians* the Cuſtom was that whoſoever preſented any new Law to be confirmed, ſhould come with a halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his requeſt were rejected; alſo *Lycurgus* to prevent the alteration of his Lawes, did ſweare the people of *Sparta* to obſerve them untill his return, and thereupon retired himſelf into voluntary exile, with intent never to returne.

When neceſſity or good reaſon moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a courſe

more

more ſecure it is to do it rather by degrees then ſuddenly. Example, The *Romans* finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, ſuffered them to be obſerved or neglected at diſcretion, but would not publickly ſuppreſs them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: ſo did they continue 700 years, and were then caſſed by *Ebutius* the *Tribune*. But *Agis* King of *Lacedemon* deſirous to revive the Laws of *Lycurgus*, long diſcontinued, enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made; which ſuddain and violent proceeding proved ſo fatal, that it moved a dangerous ſedition, wherein he was depoſed and with his Mother and Friends put to death; which Example haply moved the *Venetians* not to attempt any thing againſt the Authority of *Auguſtino Barberino* their Duke: but after his death, and before the Election of *Loredono*, the *Signiory* publiſht new Ordinances detractive from the *Ducal* Anthority.

Whoſo hath won to himſelf ſo great Love and Affection, as thereby to become maſter of the forces, and at his pleaſure commands the Subjects apt for Armes, may alſo without right or title aſſure himſelf of the whole Eſtate. Example, *Hugh*

*Capat* a Subject to the Crown of *France*, being greatly honored by the Soldiers, found means thereby to prevent *Charles Duke* of *Lorraine* of the Crown, being right heire by deſcent from *Charlemaine*. And albeit the Families of the *Paleologi*, *Ebrami* and *Turcani* be of the blood Royall and Right Heires to the *Turkiſh* Empire, when the *Ottaman* Line ſhall faile; yet it is like that the cheif *Baſſa* having the love of the *Janiſaries* will uſurpe the State, becauſe the *Paleologi* and other Competitors be far from the *Turks* perſon, poor and without means to purchaſe the Soldiers favor.

A Commander General in Armes, ought upon paine of great puniſhment be enjoyned, not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his Commiſſion. Example, The *Dictators* of *Rome* were in this point ſo preciſe, as never any of them dared to tranſgreſs the time prefixed, till *Caſar* obtained that dignity ſhould continue in him for life: which was the cauſe of his uſurpation of the State. Alſo the *Thebans* commanded, that if the General of their Army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt, he ſhould thereby incur danger of death: which Juſtice was executed upon *Epaminondas* and *Pelopidas*.

Baniſh-

Banishment of great Lords, or Citizens of great Reputation, hath bin in divers places diversly used: for in the one, they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction; in the other, Banishment was accompanied with Confiscation, a course of great danger. Example; In *Argos*, *Athens*, *Ephesus*, and other Cities of *Greece*, the Citizens puissant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times banisht for envy or feare, but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer then Ten years, and that without loss of goods, which was the cause that never any of them Warred against the Country: but *Dion* being banisht *Syracusa* by *Dyonysius Junior*, and *Coriolanus* from *Rome*, did make mighty Wars against their own Country. The like was done by the *Medici* in *Florence*.

Honorable and Magnanimous men were wont, not only to enterprise great Acts, but also to suffer patiently al injuries which Foes or Fortune could expose them to: as resolved, that no Calamity was so great as to make their minds abject, or to forget the dignity appertaing to persons vertuous: Example. After the defeat of the *Roman* Army upon the River *Allia*, the *Galli* persued the Victory even to *Romes* Walls: whither being come, and finding the gates

open, without any ſigne of reſiſtance they entred the Streets, where all honorable Palaces were alſo unſhut, which cauſed the *Galli* greatly to doubt. Nevertheleſs looking into the houſes, they found in every of them a Senator ſet in a Chaire of State, and in his hand a Rod of Ivory; his perſon was alſo veſted with Robes of dignity, which Majeſtick ſpectacle did marvelouſly amate the *Galli* not having before that time ſeen any ſuch Reverend ſight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence, but highly admired the *Roman* Courage, cheifly in that Fortune. Nevertheleſs at length a rude *Gall* hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of *M. Papyrius*, whereat he taking great diſdain ſtruk him with his Rod, in requitall whereof the Barbarian ſlew *Papyrius*, and by that example all the other Senators and perſons of dignity were alſo ſlain.

Albeit the knowledge and ſtudy of Letters be both commendable and neceſſary in all well regulated States; yet if under ſo honeſt pretence, idleneſs enter, ſuch abuſes muſt ſeaſonably be foreſeen and removed. Example, When *Diogenes* and *Carneades* two excellent Philoſophers, were ſent Ambaſſadors from *Athens* to the *Romans*, many of the Nobility that before diſpoſed them-

themſelves to Arms, allured with their Eloquence and marvellous wiſdom, began with great admiration to follow them: and in lieu of Armes, turned their endeavors to the ſtudie of Letters, which the wiſe *Cato* diſcerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eſchew all inconveniences which ſo honeſt idleneſs might breed) no philoſophers ſhould from thenceforth be received into *Rome*.

The Honor due to Magiſtrates was anciently much regarded, and contrarywiſe all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great ſeverity puniſht. Example, The Cenſors of *Rome* degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their preſence: and another called *Veſtius* was ſlain in the field for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he paſt by him It is alſo obſerved, that the ſon of *Fab. Maximus* when he was *Cenſor*, meeting his Father on horſeback; and ſeeing the Serjeants affraid to ſpeak to him to diſmount, did himſelf command him ſo to do, which Command the Father cheerfully and willingly obeyed, ſaying, Domeſtick power muſt give place to Publick Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the univerſal hate of people, found no meanes ſo meet to preſerve them from Popular fury,

as

as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef Minions and intimate Counsellors. Example, *Tiberius* delivered to the People his favorite *Seianus*: *Nero*, *Tigellinus*. *Henry* King of *Swede* committed to their fury his best beloved servant *George Preston*; *Caracalla* caused all his flatterers to be slain that had perswaded him to kill his brother. The like was done by *Caligula*, whereby he escaped himself.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aspired to Soveraignty, shall thereby both incur great danger and hate, and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself Therefore wise Princes have not only left such services quite unrecompenced, but also most severely punished them. Example. The Emperor *Severus* put all those to death that consented to the murder of *Pertinax*; and *Alexander* the great executed him that slew *Darius*, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent hands on his Prince, notwithstanding he were an enemy. Likewise *Vitellius* put to death all the Murderers and conspirators against *Galba*; and *Domitian* executed his Secretary *Epaphroditus* for the Murder of *Nero*, although he instantly desired his aid.

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The vertuous and vitious examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the ſame Qualities; which rule never or very rarely fails. Example, *Francis* the Firſt King of *France*, and other Princes in divers ages and places, had great eſteem of Learned Men; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility, and Clergy, diſpoſed themſelves ſo earneſtly to ſtudy, as before that time had not been ſeen ſo many and ſo great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwiſe, *Alexander* the Great, otherwiſe a Prince of great vertue, by his immoderate uſe of drinking, did draw the greateſt number of his Court and people alſo to delight in drunkenneſs. The like effect followed the exceſſive intemperance of *Mithridates*, King of *Amaſia*.

The laſt and not the leaſt conſiderable, is to obſerve how great effects Devotion and Contempt of Humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private perſons, but of Kings and Princes alſo, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit, Honor, and Pleaſure, to embrace the contemplative retired life. Example, *Ramirus* King of *Aragon*, *Verecundus* King of *Spain*, *Charlemain* Son of *Carolus Martellus*, *Matilda* Queen of *France*, *Amurath* K. of *Turkey*, with many others. *Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.*

*FINIS.*